Inside brokers by LI, Frank Weikai et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
10-2017
Inside brokers
Frank Weikai LI
Singapore Management University, wkli@smu.edu.sg
Abhiroop MUKHERJEE
Rik SEN
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Management Information Systems Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LI, Frank Weikai; MUKHERJEE, Abhiroop; and SEN, Rik. Inside brokers. (2017). 1-61. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School
Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5324
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2823353 
Inside Brokers
Frank Weikai Li, Abhiroop Mukherjee, and Rik Sen
October 2017∗
Abstract
We identify the broker each corporate insider trades through, and show that ana-
lysts and mutual fund managers affiliated with such “inside brokers” retain a substan-
tial information advantage on the insider’s firm, even after these trades are disclosed.
Affiliated analysts issue 10–20% more accurate earnings forecasts, and affiliated funds
trade the insider’s stock much more profitably than their peers, following insider trades
through their brokerage. Our results challenge the prevalent perception that informa-
tion asymmetry arising from insider trading is acute only before trade disclosure, and
suggest that brokers facilitating these trades are in a unique position to exploit such
an asymmetry.
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1 Introduction
Insiders, by definition, have favored access to private information about their firm, and a large
body of literature shows that they benefit from trading on such information.1 But if such
insider trades become a substantial part of stock turnover, other uninformed traders face the
risk of being adversely selected against, which affects their willingness to trade (Kyle (1985),
Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). This is the theoretical motivation behind insider trading
laws and other regulations that try to keep adverse selection concerns of market participants
under control, for example through the public disclosure of insider trades within a short time
window. Such laws, as well as the agencies charged with their enforcement – which now exist
in almost all countries (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) – share two key premises. First,
the enforcement of these laws focuses largely on people involved professionally with any firm
– especially executives and directors, lawyers, accountants, etc. – under the assumption that
they are the most obvious conduits of significant inside information. Second, the regulatory
regime, as well as the academic and policy discourse, operates under the assumption that
asymmetric information issues generated by insider trading are dissipated by trade disclosure,
i.e., within a few days after the trade.
In this paper, we question both of these premises by focusing on brokers facilitating
insider trades.
First, we show that in addition to focusing on people professionally involved with the firm,
the law and its enforcement agencies should also focus on people professionally involved with
firm insiders as individuals – like the insider’s stock broker. Specifically, we show that
during the insider trading process, some of the inside information advantage – beyond that
contained in the public disclosure of the trade itself – passes to the insider’s broker, and the
brokerage benefits from this advantage.
Second, our results also indicate that the “inside” broker’s information advantage arising
from the trading process continues well after the public disclosure of the trade itself. While
the law requires that insiders publicly reveal the trading date and the number of shares
traded in their company stock within a short window, such disclosure is not sufficient to
eliminate all obvious and substantial sources of information asymmetry arising from insider
trades.
1See, for example, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986, 1998), Rozeff and Zaman
(1988), Lin and Howe (1990), Karpoff and Lee (1991), Bettis, Vickery and Vickery (1997), Lakonishok and
Lee (2001), Marin and Olivier (2008), and Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012).
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Our analysis focuses on two related yet distinct reflections of such an inside broker ad-
vantage.
First, we show that the equity analyst who covers the insider’s firm at the insider’s
brokerage provides significantly more accurate earnings forecasts. In terms of economic
magnitude, the inside broker-affiliated analyst issues 10–20% more accurate forecasts of
annual earnings after the insider has traded through her brokerage. This accuracy is relative
to that of other analysts issuing forecasts on the same firm at the same time, and even
relative to her own forecast accuracy on the same firm at other times without insider trades.
Second, we find that mutual funds affiliated with such an inside broker also enjoy a sig-
nificant information advantage when they trade the insider’s company shares. A portfolio
trading strategy that goes long (short) on the connected insider’s stock when the affili-
ated fund has bought (sold) that stock significantly more than their peers following a trade
through their brokerage earns large abnormal returns. Again in terms of economic magni-
tude, these risk-adjusted returns are of the order of 55-60 basis points per month over the
following quarter.
Importantly, since these affiliated analysts’ forecasts are issued – and fund managers’
holdings are disclosed – well after the occurrence of the insider trade itself becomes public
knowledge through SEC filings, our evidence suggests that not all of the inside broker’s
information advantage is dissipated by trade disclosure. The inside broker’s information
advantage, therefore, is pervasive, substantial, and long-lived.
The plausibility of our narrative depends on affiliated analysts/mutual fund managers
following publicly disclosed trades of insiders who trade through their brokerage division.
Such a scenario is perhaps likely: when an analyst/fund manager realizes that a particular
insider has traded through her firm, given her incentive to generate an information advantage,
she might communicate with her broker colleague who interacted with the insider to glean
something useful. For instance, the broker would know the nature of the trading instruction
– was the order placed as a limit order a year in advance to be executed at the end of
some particular month, or was it a quick market order placed right after a board meeting?
The former kind of trade is obviously less likely to be information driven. However, market
participants in general would never know whether the trade was through a limit or a market
order, even after the insider trade is publicly disclosed. Many other channels could also
endow the inside broker with a similar information advantage. To mention one more, the
insider’s personal broker might also know, for example, whether the sale of inside stock
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was accompanied by sales of other, unrelated stocks that the insider owns. This could help
ascertain whether the trade was more likely due to liquidity reasons or information driven.
Again, the rest of the market will never have this information.2
The key to this study is the identity of different insiders’ brokers. We identify these
brokers through SEC’s Form 144, through which insiders are required to report certain types
of stock sales (specifically, sales of restricted and control shares), as well as the broker used
for each such transaction. We hand-match these brokerage names to I/B/E/S brokers to
identify affiliated analysts, and separately to CRSP/ Thomson Reuters mutual fund names
to ascertain affiliated mutual funds (broker-affiliated mutual funds as those that belong to a
fund family that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage house, e.g., “Wells
Fargo Small Cap Fund” is affiliated with Wells Fargo’s brokerage).
The granularity of panel data available in these databases aids identification by allow-
ing us to incorporate a rich set of fixed effects and placebo tests to rule out unobserved
heterogeneity.3 For example, in our tests using analyst forecasts, we can add fixed effects
for every firm-time, broker-analyst-firm, and broker-analyst-time pair. The firm-time fixed
effects control for the forecast accuracy of all analysts covering the firm at the same time
and help account for the possibility that insider trades might precede periods during which
it is easier to make more accurate earnings forecasts, or the possibility that all analysts are
able to make better forecasts after observing a trade by an insider.
Since we can also include broker-analyst-firm fixed effects, the identification of our effect
comes from earnings forecasts by a specific analyst at the insiders’ broker showing higher
accuracy in the period after the trade, relative to her own forecasts on the same firm in other
periods. As a result, any omitted variable that is invariant at the broker-analyst-firm level
(for example firm-specific analyst skill, or school ties between analysts and insiders (e.g.,
Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010)) does not affect our inference.
Additionally, broker-analyst-time fixed effects help control for time-varying analyst or
brokerage level unobservables, such as analyst industry/sector experience, accuracy, or the
possibility that in some years the brokerage is more resource constrained, which could affect
the forecast accuracy of its analysts due to their inability to do adequate research.
We follow up these results on connected analyst accuracy with a series of placebo tests,
2We list more such sources of the inside broker’s information advantage in Section 6.
3Specifically, data granularity is at the firm - broker - analyst - time level for I/B/E/S, and the stock-
(broker-affiliated) mutual fund - time level for Thomson Reuters.
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each designed to rule out alternative explanations based on time-varying personal relation-
ships or other types of unobserved (to the econometrician) business ties between the insiders’
firm and the brokerage. Specifically, we consider breaks in the analyst-firm connection due
to (1) analysts changing jobs, (2) insiders changing brokers, and (3) insiders changing jobs.
In each case, we follow the analyst’s performance in the period right after the connection
breaks. None of these samples show any significant relation between forecast accuracy and
insider trading – either in terms of statistical significance, or in terms of economic magnitude
– revealing the imperativeness of the “inside broker” relationship.
Next, we use affiliated mutual fund trading to show complementary evidence. In our
mutual fund tests, we first show that affiliated mutual funds trade more aggressively than
other competing mutual funds who also trade at the same time in the insider’s stock following
the insider trade. While this in itself is not evidence of using information obtained through
the inside broker connection, we further show that these affiliated trades are, on average,
predictive: when affiliated mutual funds sell the connected stock much more heavily than
their peers following the insider trade, the stock under-performs significantly. Overall, then,
affiliated mutual funds seem to be actively exploiting their information advantage on the
insider’s stock.
Second, we examine what happens to the future returns of other stocks not connected
through broker ties that these same affiliated mutual funds trade at the same time as their
connected stock. Our results show that these not-connected trades do not generate any
abnormal future returns, unlike the connected trades. Since we are now comparing the same
mutual fund’s trade on other stocks at the same time as the connected trade, this rules out
any fund-time alternatives, e.g., time-varying fund skill/attention/resources.
Finally, we also examine future stock return performance when the same affiliated mutual
fund trades more aggressively on a stock to which they had an inside broker connection in the
past, but are not currently connected; that is, previously connected stock trades in periods
when the insider did not trade through the affiliated broker. Again we find no abnormal
returns, ruling out fund-stock level unobserved heterogeneity – such as differences in trading
profitability at the fund-stock level, which can arise for example from school ties between
firm insiders and fund managers (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008)) or from information
advantages from holding local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)).
We again follow this up with two placebo tests to rule out alternative explanations, using
breaks in the fund-stock link through insiders changing their jobs or their brokers. Again,
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our placebo results are both economically and statistically insignificant.
One key aspect of the affiliated fund trading profitability results is that they indicate that
the market in general does not appreciate the time-varying value of the brokerage affiliation.4
Given this, one might also expect that the market does not completely figure out that the
connected analyst’s opinions are relatively more valuable in periods when the insider trades
through her brokerage. We find this to be true in the data: one can generate abnormal profits
by designing a trading strategy that identifies – ex-ante – the profitability of the connected
analyst’s recommendations, based on the existence of an insider trade through the analyst’s
brokerage. Overall, our evidence therefore portrays a consistent story.
While our results are robust across a variety of dimensions, not all firms are, of course,
equally susceptible to the type of activity we document. In the cross-section, we find that
the inside broker’s information advantage is greater for firms whose stocks trade in a worse
information environment: smaller, higher-return-volatility growth firms, those with higher
dispersion of analyst forecasts, and those with higher R&D expenses. Examining different
types of insider trades, we find that the advantage is greater following trades that are larger
and less frequent. Finally, we also find evidence that in the cross-section of analysts/fund
managers, those that have more pressing career concerns – for example due to higher com-
petition – seem to be making more use of this advantage. Again, the robustness of these
cross-sectional results is attested to by the fact that they are borne out across two very dis-
tinct types of tests in two different samples: one using analyst forecast accuracy, the other
using affiliated funds’ trading profitability.
Interestingly, unlike many other studies documenting analyst information advantages, we
find that the advantage of the connected analyst exists only after Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Reg FD). This could be because before Reg FD, analysts could have had preferential access
to insiders through various direct-access channels. Following Reg FD, the relative advantage
of the connected analyst, arising from her unique access to information due to her position
at the insider’s brokerage firm, goes up. We do not observe such a clear time difference in
our mutual fund results.
In our final set of analyses, we return to the mechanism underlying our result and examine
a specific but clean context in which we are able to demonstrate the precise nature of the
connected analyst’s information advantage. To understand our test design here, note that
the information advantage we have in mind has to exist beyond the public disclosure of the
4Or even if it does, some friction prevents it from trading all potential profits away.
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trade itself. At the same time, we, as econometricians, have to be able to point out its
existence from data observable to us, that is, from publicly available data.
One such candidate is a first-in-a-regular-sequence trade by an insider. Suppose an insider
sells restricted stock every January. As Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2013) show, these
regular trades are less likely to be information-driven. We conjecture that after observing
the same insider trading at the same time over a few (say, three) consecutive years, all
market participants will realize that such trades are part of a regular sequence and, hence,
not information-driven. However, when the January trade happens for the first time, the
typical outsider would not be able to foresee that this is going to be a regular and therefore
uninformative occurrence. But the affiliated analyst and fund manager might know this,
if the information gets conveyed to the insider’s broker. So the inside broker’s relative
information advantage is likely to be strongest for the first-in-sequence trades and weaken
as the next-in-sequence trades start coming in. This is exactly what we observe in the data,
again, both with affiliated analysts and mutual fund trades.5
This result on the inside broker’s information advantage on first-in-a-regular-sequence
trades also helps rule out a possible alternative explanation based on reverse causality. The
reverse causality argument is that at certain points in time, the connected analyst/fund
manager has some information or analysis advantage over everyone else – an advantage
that does not have its source in the insider’s trade. Naturally, at these times the affiliated
analyst issues better forecasts and the affiliated fund manager trades more profitably on
the insider’s company. Crucially, these are also times when the insider’s broker actually
recommends that the insider trade in the same direction as the analyst/fund. In sum, the
information advantage originates from the analyst or the fund manager and gets transmitted
to the insider through her broker’s trading recommendation. However, our first-in-a-regular-
sequence trade is an example of a trade which is not particularly informed about anything at
the firm, yet the inside broker knows something more than the market. She knows that this
is the start of a repeated trading pattern and hence is not information-driven. This is not a
trading idea that could plausibly have originated from the affiliated analyst’s or manager’s
superior information or analysis, so reverse causality cannot explain our result here.
Finally, although we focus on insider trades through brokers in this paper, what we
uncover may have more general implications for the role played by such intermediaries. Our
results here suggest a role for brokers as information intermediaries, not just mechanical
5Of course, the inside broker also has significant information advantage on the irregular trades (i.e., those
that are not in a sequence, and hence more likely to be informative), as one might expect.
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facilitators of the trading process. Brokers might acquire an information advantage based on
the nature of trading instructions or their interaction with clients – and such clients may not
just be firm insiders. Brokers may also have many other avenues of asymmetric information
advantages. To cite just a few, the broker might obtain a unique information advantage in
knowing or inferring that an activist is gradually building stakes before a form 13D filing, or
that a potential suitor is gradually building a toehold, or that a company founder is gradually
selling his stake in the open market. Overall, then, we might just be touching upon the tip
of the iceberg in this paper with respect to broker uniqueness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related literature,
Section 3 details our data, Section 4 presents our main results on affiliated analysts and
mutual funds, Section 5 presents cross-sectional evidence, Section 6 discusses some sources
of the inside broker’s information advantage, Section 7 discussed the legal implications of
our findings, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature and our contribution
Our study contributes to the literature examining analysts’ and fund managers’ access to
private information through their interactions with firm managers. For example, Coval and
Moskowitz (2001) show that fund managers earn substantial abnormal returns in local in-
vestments, while Malloy (2005) and Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) find that local analysts are
more accurate than other analysts, suggesting that geographical proximity facilitates infor-
mation flows. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008, 2010) document that fund managers and
analysts who have an educational link to company management outperform others on their
stock trades/recommendations. Green, Jame, Markov and Subasi (2014) find that access
to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative analyst re-
search. While all of these studies indicate that selective disclosure from managers is an
important source of information advantage, this paper focuses on flows of inside information
into markets through a broker: a link not examined before, and of special interest in the reg-
ulatory context. Also, most of the earlier results, especially those with analysts, come from
the pre-Reg FD period. In contrast, the information advantage connected analysts enjoy in
our paper comes from their brokerage-affiliated insider trading activities, rather than direct
access to management, and, perhaps as a result, lasts well after Reg FD (Table 9, Panel A).
This means that our results are still topical and relevant to policy.
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The second strand of literature our study contributes to is that on affiliated analysts and
mutual funds. Lin and McNichols (1998) examine the effect of underwriting relationships on
analysts’ forecasting behavior. They show that analysts’ growth forecasts and recommen-
dations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although
their short-term earnings forecasts are not generally higher. Chung and Cho (2005) show
that analysts cover stocks that are handled by affiliated dealers and issue optimistic reports
on them to generate order flow. Massa and Rehman (2008) show that mutual funds increase
their holdings in firms that borrow from affiliated commercial banks and are able to deliver
better performance on these holdings, presumably due to an information advantage. Mola
and Guidolin (2009) find that analysts issue favorable ratings on stocks that their affiliated
mutual funds have invested in. In contrast to these papers, we not only look at a distinct
channel, but also explicitly identify mechanisms by which a brokerage affiliation allows both
analysts and fund managers to deliver superior performance (Section 6).
Our study is also related to papers that show brokers may be able to take advantage of
their knowledge that an insider is trading. Geczy and Yan (2006) show that market makers
who are also the brokers of insiders quote more aggressively on the day of the insider trade.
However, this could also be consistent with inventory management by the market maker.
MacNally, Shkilko and Smith (2015) show evidence that is consistent with brokers used by
insiders in Canada engaging in tipping and insider trading on the same day as the insider
trade. We make two main contributions relative to these papers.
First, the results of these papers imply that brokers have an information advantage before
the public disclosure of the trade. Although interesting in its own right, this is perhaps not
too surprising, and one might expect that such an information advantage would dissipate
when the insider trade is revealed publicly. In contrast, our study shows that brokers retain
an information advantage even well after the insider trade becomes public, which implies
that some information beyond that contained in the trade disclosure itself passes to the
inside broker. Information asymmetry arising from the insider trading process, therefore, is
long-lived, contrary to what is typically assumed in many theoretical as well as empirical
studies. Second, in the general setting of any insider trade used in these earlier papers, it
is difficult to rule out reverse causality, which we can in this paper. The reverse causality
hypothesis of concern in the literature is that it was the analyst at the inside broker, or the
broker herself, who conducted analysis independently and recommended the trade to the
insider and their other clients. If this were true, the data would show – as in this literature –
that the inside brokers’ clients trade more heavily in the direction of the insider trade than
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clients of other non-connected brokers in the pre-disclosure period. In this paper, we can rule
out this possibility by specifically examining our subset of first-in-a-regular-sequence trades.
Finally, we show that there is significant and long-lived information gained by the broker
facilitating insider trades, and that this results in more accurate affiliated analyst fore-
casts/more profitable affiliated fund trades. Consistent with our results on the broker’s
advantage, Di Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2017) uncover evidence of an-
other distinct use of information by central brokers – involving the leakage of information
gathered through execution of trades for their most important institutional clients.
3 Data
Insider trading data and information about the broker used by the insider are obtained
from Form 144 files in the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database. This is a different
source of information from Form 4, which is what most papers on corporate insider trading
look at. We explain details about the background of regulations that require the filing of
Form 144, and the nature of the information in these forms, in the Internet Appendix (IA).
Moreover, Table 1 in the IA shows that insider sales reported on Form 144 are – on average –
informative about future returns of the firm. We manually standardize broker names reported
by different insiders and hand-match these names to I/B/E/S brokers.6 Information about
investment banks involved in security issuances is obtained from SDC Platinum database.
Firm characteristics are obtained from the S&P Compustat database.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics for key variables used in our analysis. Our
sample starts in 1997, which is the first year for which there is sufficient coverage of Form
144 data in the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database, and it ends in 2013. After
we match the Form 144 data to I/B/E/S, the resultant database covers 591,715 trades
by insiders at 11,380 firms. The median firm in our database has 9 distinct insiders who
traded during the sample period. Trades have a median size of $250,620, while the mean
is much larger and close to $3 million. In years when there is at least one trade, there is a
median of five Form 144 trades, and they aggregate to a median of 0.4% of the company’s
shares outstanding. We present more details on these trades in Table 1, Panel A. The five
most common brokers of insiders by number of trades are Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Morgan
6We use the mapping between broker identifiers and broker names from the 2007 vintage of I/B/E/S,
since the latest vintage does not have this information.
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Stanley, Paine Webber, and Deutsche Bank Alex Brown. In Panel B, we present summary
statistics for the full sample of analysts, in Panel C for the sample of connected analysts, and
in Panel D on forecasts made by connected analysts in periods where there is no connection
(the pseudo-connect sample). In Panel E we present statistics on the Compustat variables
we use, and in Panel F on analyst recommendation changes.
We get mutual fund quarterly holdings data from the Thomson Reuters mutual fund
(S12) database. We define broker-affiliated mutual funds as those belonging to a fund family
that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage house. We manually identify
such affiliated mutual funds by parsing fund names in CRSP/ Thomson Reuters mutual
fund databases containing names of brokerage houses. For example, “Wells Fargo Small
Cap Fund” is affiliated with Wells Fargo’s brokerage. We collapse multiple classes of the
same fund by taking the TNA (total net assets) weighted average of the individual classes’
characteristics. The TNA of the fund itself is the sum of the TNAs of the individual classes
that belong to the fund.
Panel G of Table 1 provides information on the broker-affiliated funds sample. Over the
whole sample, our data contain 215 distinct funds involving 1533 unique stocks. We identify
16 distinct brokers with affiliated mutual funds, and these brokers each have 16 affiliated
funds on average. The mean TNA of broker-affiliated funds is 387 million USD, and these
funds have a mean annual expense ratio of 1.43% and a turnover ratio of 0.86. The bottom
two rows of the panel report the monthly raw and net returns of broker-affiliated funds
and non-affiliated funds. The monthly raw return is 0.65% and the net return is 0.54% for
affiliated funds, which are very similar to the numbers for non-affiliated funds. This suggests
that in general, affiliated funds are not more skillful than other funds. We measure mutual
fund trading on a stock as the quarterly change in percentage of outstanding company shares
held by a fund.
4 Main Results
4.1 Analysts employed at inside brokers
In this section, we investigate whether the analyst employed by the insider’s brokerage firm
has an information advantage over other analysts following trades by that insider. We do so
by examining whether inside broker-affiliated analysts are more accurate in their forecasts
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in Section 4.1.1, and by looking at the profitability of trading on their recommendations
around the next earnings announcements in Section 4.3.
Note, however, that we deliberately do not explore the timing or magnitude of fore-
cast or recommendation changes made by the inside analyst. This is because our frame-
work makes no clear prediction about whether the connected analyst should update her
forecasts/recommendations faster or more boldly after seeing a trade. To see this clearly,
consider a connected analyst obtaining information through the insider’s broker that a large
insider sale – which is observed by everyone and likely to be construed as bad news – is
in fact not so (e.g., a first-in-a-regular-sequence trade, as in Section 6). In this case, the
analyst would choose not to change her forecast or recommendation on the company at all,
at a time when other analysts might do so.7 The only prediction from our framework is
that her forecast after her choice of action – or inaction – following the trade will be more
accurate; this is what we test.
Our main measure is analysts’ scaled annual percentage absolute EPS forecast error
(PAFE). We focus on annual earnings forecasts in I/B/E/S, following the literature (Lin and
McNichols (1998), Clement (1999), Malloy (2005), Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), Bradley,
Gokkaya and Liu (2017), among others), as these are the most commonly issued types of
forecasts. The PAFE for analyst i on stock j in fiscal year t is equal to the absolute value of an
analyst’s latest forecast, minus actual company earnings (drawn from the I/B/E/S Actuals
File), as a percentage of stock price 12 months prior to the actual earnings announcement
date. The smaller the absolute forecast error, the more accurate the analyst’s forecast.
PAFEi,j,t =
100 ∗ |Actual EPSi,j,t − Forecasted EPSi,j,t|
Pricej,t−1
(1)
We run panel regressions of PAFE on a connect dummy – our key explanatory variable,
and control for various high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE), such as those at the level of
each stock-year, stock-analyst, and analyst-year.
PAFEi,j,t = β1 + β2Connecti,j,t + β3Affili,j,t + β4Fore agei,j,t + paired HDFE + i,j,t (2)
The connect dummy is equal to 1 when the analyst issues an earnings forecast on a stock
within a certain period after the firm’s insiders trade through the brokerage house employing
7In addition, there might be another cost to updating immediately after every insider trade through one’s
own brokerage – that of attracting unnecessary regulatory scrutiny.
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this analyst, and zero otherwise. Affil is an indicator for the parent of the brokerage house
having an investment banking relationship with the insider’s firm, and Fore age controls for
the vintage of the forecast to make sure that we distill our effect out from that of forecast
recency.
4.1.1 Baseline results on forecast accuracy
In our baseline specification, we examine whether an analyst issues more accurate earnings
forecasts on firms where at least one insider traded through the brokerage employing the
analyst during that earnings year. One concern is that such connected analysts may be
different in terms of other characteristics that correlate with forecast accuracy. For exam-
ple, firm officers are more likely to trade through prestigious brokerage firms, and previous
research documents that analysts employed by such brokerages are on average more accu-
rate than those working in lower-tier brokerage houses (Clement (1999)). The effect of the
connect dummy on forecast accuracy could then be due to a brokerage effect, rather than
the information obtained through the insiders’ broker. The common approach used by pre-
vious studies to mitigate such endogeneity concerns is to add various brokerage, analyst and
firm characteristics that could be correlated with forecast accuracy. In this paper, we use a
different approach that controls for a richer set of possibilities, including some not directly
observable, using high-dimensional (interacted) fixed effects for brokerage, analysts, firm and
year paired combinations. Our approach addresses endogeneity concerns more comprehen-
sively because the controls employed by previous papers are absorbed by at least one of these
paired fixed effects. Of course, our results are also robust to the more traditional approach
taken in the literature of using a variety of control variables.
Table 2 reports these regression results. In column (1), we add firm, year and brokerage
fixed effects. The coefficient on the connect dummy is -0.15 and highly significant (t=-5.53).
This means that, consistent with our hypothesis, analysts are more accurate at forecasting a
firm’s earnings when one of that firm’s insiders trades through the brokerage employing her
during the past year. The economic magnitude of the increase in relative forecast accuracy
for the connected analysts is also quite large. The mean of the percentage absolute forecast
error (PAFE) across our sample of analysts who are connected to a firm at some period,
but not connected currently, is 0.72 (Table 1, Panel D). Hence our coefficient represents a
20.8% reduction in average forecast errors. In columns (2) and (3), we add paired fixed
effects such as broker-firm and firm-year effects. The coefficient on the connect dummy is
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still significantly negative, although the magnitude is reduced by half. In column (4), we
add a comprehensive set of paired fixed effects, including firm-year, analyst-broker-firm and
analyst-broker-year effects. We still find the connect dummy to be significantly negative
(t=-2.92). Connected analysts thus issue more accurate forecasts on the firms’ annual EPS,
compared to (i) all other analysts following the same firm in the current fiscal year, (ii) their
own forecasts on other non-connected firms at the same time, and (iii) their own forecasts
issued on the same firm during other periods when no firm insider traded through their
brokerage firm.
One aspect of our data worth mentioning here concerns the statistical significance of our
results given our large sample. While large samples typically allow for more precise estima-
tion of effects, in our design we are essentially estimating the forecast accuracy of treated
(inside-broker connected) stock-firm pairs minus control pairs. The number of treated pairs,
even in our large sample, is understandably rare (2.92% of all observations, Table 1, Panel
B). So, essentially, the control is being estimated very precisely in our case, because we have
many control observations. But that cannot reduce the standard error in the estimate of
the treatment group. Consequently, the standard error of the difference cannot go down be-
yond a particular point. Given this data structure, our treatment estimates are, if anything,
surprisingly precise.
Although our pairs of firm-year, analyst-broker-year and analyst-broker-firm fixed effects
capture most of the analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics that may correlate with
the connect dummy and affect forecast error, there are still a couple of covariates that
vary at the analyst-firm-time level, and are therefore not subsumed by these fixed effects.
For example, prior studies (Clement (1999)) document that forecast age is a significant
determinant of forecast accuracy, where forecast age is defined as log number of days from
the forecast announcement day to the earnings announcement day. The literature finds that
old forecasts are on average less accurate than more recent forecasts. In our case, it could be
that connected analysts issue forecasts only after they see the insider trades, so it is possible
that the age of connected forecasts is on average lower than that of non-connected ones.
Another possibility is that firm managers use the same brokerage firm for underwriting their
firm’s shares and executing their own trades. Many papers (Lin and McNichols (1998), Hong
and Kubik (2003)) find that analysts who cover stocks underwritten by their own brokerage
houses forecast differently. Hence, our results could be driven by this underwriting affiliation
rather than by brokerage-affiliated insider trading.
To alleviate these concerns, we add forecast age (Fore age) and an affiliation dummy
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(Affil) indicating any underwriting relationship between the analyst and the covered firm
in the regression. Specifically, the affiliation dummy is equal to 1 if the analyst issues an
earnings forecast on a stock within 1 year after its IPO or SEO date for which her brokerage
house is the lead underwriter for the IPO or SEO. Column (5) of Table 2 reports this result.
First, we see that the coefficient on forecast age is significantly positive, consistent with the
literature that older forecasts are less accurate. The coefficient on the affiliation dummy is
negative but not significant.
More importantly, the connect dummy is not affected by adding these two additional
controls. The coefficient on the connect dummy is -0.076 and significant at the 1% level.
This coefficient means that connected analysts on average have a 10.5% smaller forecast error
when the insider trades through their brokerage, even in this very stringent specification.
This is an economically significant reduction, especially given that (i) the magnitude is
measured with respect to the analyst’s own forecast accuracy in periods without the inside
information advantage, and (ii) the effect we capture is an average “intention-to-treat” effect
– the link we identify captures potential for information transmission, but does not allow
us to exclude cases where there was no differential information transmitted in the trading
process.
We do a variety of other tests to understand the robustness of our results, which we
report in our Internet Appendix (IA). First, in Table 2 in the IA, we find that winsoriz-
ing our dependent variable PAFE at different thresholds, using stock prices one month or
even one quarter prior to the earnings announcement date to scale absolute forecast errors,
or controlling for forecast frequency and firm-specific relative experience (which have been
shown by the literature to affect analyst forecast accuracy) do not affect our results. Second,
we show that even if we use a fixed sample so that we have the same number of observations
across the columns of Table 3 to make the columns more comparable (Table 3 in the IA),
similar conclusions obtain. Third, we examine the alternative explanation that connected
analysts are less optimistic on average, and therefore more accurate given the overall opti-
mism bias of analysts previously documented, and find no such evidence (Table 4 in the IA).
Their optimism is similar to those without an inside broker connection; they are just more
accurate.
Finally, we do further tests which show that the inside analysts’ information advantage
also extends to forecasting slightly more accurate earnings growth rates and long-horizon
earnings (Tables 5 and 6 in the IA), but the effect is much less pronounced than it is for
short-horizon earnings forecasts, both economically and statistically.
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4.1.2 Alternative Hypotheses and Falsification Tests
Our results so far are consistent with the hypothesis that inside analysts obtain information
beyond that contained in the public disclosure of the insider trade itself, which they use to
improve their earnings forecasts on the connected firm. Our use of a rich set of paired firm,
analyst, broker and time fixed effects makes alternative explanations unlikely to explain our
finding. However, this does not rule out the possibility that some time-varying versions
of the alternative hypotheses we outlined earlier could be consistent with our result. For
example, Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010) find that analysts who have attended the same
college as the firm managers have an information advantage on the connected firm when
making recommendations. Since the school connection between the analyst and the insider
is time-invariant, our analyst-firm fixed effect will capture any such effect if the information
flow from insider to analyst is also stable over time. However, the information flow from
the insider to the analyst may well be time-varying. An insider may have significant private
information only in some periods, and it may be that it is in these periods that he both
trades and communicates the information to his school friend the inside analyst. Our earlier
tests are not specified to deal with such an issue.
Hence, to rule out such possibilities, and to show that the channel through which the
inside analyst gets more accurate information is indeed contingent on insiders trading through
her brokerage, we conduct three falsification tests. Specifically, we consider breaks in the
analyst-firm connection due to (i) analysts changing jobs, (ii) insiders changing brokers, and
(iii) insiders changing jobs. We then create a pseudo-connect dummy for an analyst-firm pair
that is connected at a different time through the inside broker link, but not in the period
when this dummy is equal to one. We then regress PAFE on the pseudo-connect dummy
and see whether we get the same result as we get for the actual connect dummy. If we do,
then our inside-broker channel may not be the reason behind what we find.
Consider first an analyst who moves to a not-connected brokerage house but continues to
cover the same firm as he did for the inside broker. We define a pseudo-connect dummy equal
to 1 when such an analyst issues a new forecast after the firm insider’s trades through the old
broker (that the analyst no longer works for). We then regress PAFE on this pseudo-connect
dummy, with and without the true connect dummy. The results are reported in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3.
What does this help rule out? For example, let’s think of the alternative hypothesis
outlined before: time-varying information flows attached to school ties between insiders and
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analysts. If this alternative were true, we should find the pseudo-connect dummy to be just
as significantly negative, since switching to a not-connected broker should not affect the
school ties between the analyst as an individual and the firm insider as an individual. On
the other hand, the pseudo-connect dummy should be insignificant if our inside brokerage
connection is driving the result. As we can see, the coefficient on the pseudo-connect dummy
is insignificant. The economic magnitude of the pseudo-connect coefficient is also much
smaller than that of true connect, so the insignificance is not simply due to smaller sample
size.8
Our second falsification test considers the case in which the insider switches to a different
broker to execute his trades. Specifically, we create a pseudo-connect dummy equal to 1
when the analyst at the no-longer-connected brokerage issues an earnings forecast within a
year following the insider’s trade through the new broker. The result is reported in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3. The coefficient on the pseudo-connect dummy is close to -0.003 and
not significant.
This test rules out another alternative hypothesis: that our connect dummy is proxying
for other time-varying connections between the brokerage firm and the analyst, beyond what
is captured by the underwriting affiliation dummy. This could be due to the firm having
multiple book-runners (we are capturing the lead underwriter in our dummy), or perhaps
due to the broker being a market-maker for the firm, or any other such unobserved active
affiliation.
But crucially, in that case, the affiliation between the firm and the brokerage house
remains, even if one firm insider changes brokers. Hence, the pseudo-connect dummy should
be just as strongly negative and significant even after the insider switches to a new broker,
if the information advantage of the old broker’s analyst had nothing to do with the insider’s
trades and was just coming from some kind of brokerage affiliation. Our evidence goes
against this alternative: the pseudo-connect coefficient is economically and statistically very
close to zero. Therefore, active affiliation of any kind is highly unlikely to be an explanation
for our story.
We say highly unlikely instead of impossible because of one possibility: if the insider
changing his broker always coincides with the insider’s firm changing the particular affiliation
8Note that this result suggests that being co-workers in the same organization facilitates the type of
information-sharing we focus on, beyond the personal relationship between the analyst and the broker.
While it’s unlikely that the personal relationship/friendship between the broker and the analyst ceases to
operate as soon as the analyst changes jobs, our results suggest that the information-sharing relationship
does seem to taper off relatively soon.
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in question, then the alternative could still be true. However, each firm in our sample has
many insiders, and a lot of them change brokers (some of them change brokers because they
move to a different city, etc.). So, while it is possible, it is highly implausible that every time
an insider changes her broker, the firm will change its market maker or underwriter.
Our last falsification test is based on the insider moving to a new firm but retaining
his old broker to execute his trades. We create another pseudo-connect dummy equal to 1
when the analyst issues an earnings forecast on the previously connected firm following a
trade by an unconnected insider at the same firm (who does not trade through this analyst’s
brokerage) within one year of the original connection breaking. The result is reported in
columns (5) and (6). The coefficient on the pseudo-connect dummy in this case is positive
and insignificant. This results raises the bar even higher for explanations such as other
unobserved brokerage-firm relationships producing our observed effect: for that to happen,
the firm not only needs to change its (unobserved) affiliation each time an insider changes
his broker, but also needs to change affiliation each time an insider leaves the firm. This is
even more implausible.
In summary, all three falsification tests reinforce our interpretation that the channel
through which the inside analyst obtains her information advantage is the insider’s brokerage
relationship.
4.2 Broker-affiliated mutual funds
Our results on analyst forecast accuracy suggest that analysts working in an insider’s broker-
age firm are able to utilize the privileged information contained in insider trades to improve
their earnings forecast on the insider’s firm. In this section, we examine a related but distinct
hypothesis: whether the same information is also used by mutual funds affiliated with the
insider’s broker to trade profitably on the insider’s firm.
4.2.1 Return predictability using affiliated mutual fund trades
We first focus on broker-affiliated funds’ trading after Form 144 trades and compare it to
non-affiliated funds’ trading on the same stock in the same quarter. If broker-affiliated
funds benefit from the broker’s unique advantage in gleaning information from the insider’s
trades in the trading process, we expect these funds’ trades to generate abnormal returns.
Specifically, when broker-affiliated funds decrease (increase) holdings of an insider’s firm more
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relative to non-affiliated funds, it should generate negative (positive) abnormal returns. We
refrain from analyzing the performance of the entire fund, because a trading a few connected
stocks profitably need not have a statistically discernable impact on overall performance.
We start in Table 4 Panel A by examining the direction of trades and find that, on
average, inside broker-affiliated mutual funds sell more aggressively after the insider trades
through their brokerage. Again, note that our framework does not make any clear prediction
on whether the broker-affiliated funds should sell or buy after the connected insider trade, or
whether they should be more or less aggressive about it.9 To illustrate, consider an example
similar to that in Section 4.1. Suppose an affiliated mutual fund manager obtains information
through the insider’s broker that a large insider sale that everyone else infers is bad news
is in fact not so (e.g., a first-in-a-regular-sequence trade, as in Section 6). In this case, she
would choose not to change her earlier beliefs on the company, at a time when other funds
might do so. The prediction that our framework does make is that the affiliated mutual fund
manager’s trades after her choice of action – or inaction – will be more predictive about what
happens to that stock in the future than unaffiliated fund trades. We now focus on testing
this prediction.
To do so, we examine the profitability of these connected stock trades as follows. First,
we measure mutual funds’ trading on a stock as its change of quarterly holding on the stock.
To take care of time-invariant stock-specific trading differences across funds, we need to
measure a fund’s abnormal trading in each stock. We define abnormal trading by a fund as
the percent change in holdings of a stock in the quarter following a Form 144 trade minus its
change in holdings of the same stock in the quarter immediately before (when none of the
firm insiders traded). We then construct a calendar-time portfolio long in stocks associated
with Form 144 trades in which broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal buying is more aggressive
than their non-affiliated peers’ in the same quarter. The strategy goes short in the stocks
associated with Form 144 trades in which broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal selling is more
aggressive than non-affiliated funds’. Stocks enter into these portfolios, which we weight
equally, in the month following the reporting month of the mutual fund holding (rdate in
the Thomson Reuters S12 file), and are held for 3 months before re-balancing. We require
each portfolio to contain at least 30 stocks by investing in the risk-free asset in periods when
less than 30 stocks enters these portfolios.10
9We still present these results later as they are informative on the channel through which predictability
arises, as we clarify below.
10Our results are not sensitive to the exact number of stocks we require in these portfolios.
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In Table 4, Panel B we report the monthly abnormal returns to this long-short portfolio.
We see that the stocks on which broker-affiliated funds are more negative than non-affiliated
funds do worse in the following quarter. The long-short portfolio generates an excess return
43 to 58 bps per month. Columns (1) and (2) show that adjusting for risk factors using either
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model does
not affect results. In the fourth column, we use the characteristics-based benchmark of Daniel
et al. (1997), and find an abnormal return of 43 bps per month with a t-stat of 3.5. Similar
results obtain when we use the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model and the Hou, Xue
and Zhang (2016) Q-factor model.
Looking at the long and short legs of the strategy separately, we find that the abnormal
returns come largely from the short leg, not the long leg. This suggests that broker-affiliated
funds’ negative information from insider trades is more valuable than their positive infor-
mation. This asymmetry is not surprising given that Form 144 trades are all insider sales,
and contain negative information on average, as we have documented previously. Notice,
however, that since profits are strong only on the short leg, when the inside broker’s fund
is more negative than the prevailing consensus, one could argue that these results are also
consistent with the view that the market does appreciate the source of higher profitability of
inside fund trades, but short-sale frictions prevent participants from trading all profits away.
While we cannot completely rule this out, this seems less likely in the light of our results
in Panel A, which suggest that affiliated funds do trade more aggressively when they have
negative, rather than positive, information relative to their competitors; instead pointing
towards the possibility that negative information is perhaps more valuable in the context of
Form 144 sales. Also of note is that the stocks we consider are typically larger companies (a
firm in the 25th percentile of our sample still has a market-cap of $759 million and is covered
by 2 analysts). Such stocks are unlikely to have binding short-sales constraints.
In Panel C of Table 4, we re-examine the return predictability result using Fama-MacBeth
regressions. In column (1), we define a Sell dummy equal to 1 when broker-affiliated funds
sell the connected stock more aggressively than their non-affiliated peers over the same
quarter, and zero otherwise. In column (2), we define Abnormal trade as the difference in
abnormal trading between broker-affiliated and non-affiliated funds. We control for the usual
cross-sectional return predictors including size, book-to-market, 1-month return reversal and
12-month momentum. The coefficient on Sell is negative and significant, with a magnitude of
-0.0038. It indicates that when broker-affiliated funds decrease holding on the stock relative
to non-affiliated funds, the stock experiences 38 bps more negative return per month over
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the next quarter. The magnitude of abnormal returns is similar to what we observed in
the calendar-time portfolio strategy. Results in column (2) show similar evidence where the
coefficient on Abnormal trade is significantly positive.
Overall, our evidence indicates that (i) broker-affiliated mutual funds sell stocks sold by
firm insiders through their brokerage more aggressively, and (ii) following their net trading
pattern leads to a profitable trading strategy over the quarter following the insider trade, as
the information advantage they enjoy gradually materializes. Overall, these affiliated funds
seem to be using their (time-varying) information advantage on stocks connected through
the inside broker link to improve trading performance.
4.2.2 Falsification Tests
One concern about the tests above could be that broker-affiliated funds are simply better at
stock picking than non-affiliated funds. In that case, it would not be surprising that their
trades are able to predict abnormal stock returns. We find evidence that this alternative
explanation cannot explain our results. First, recall that we showed in the summary statistics
(Table 1, Panel G) that broker-affiliated funds have similar gross and net fund returns as
non-affiliated funds. In this section, we conduct several falsification tests to further address
this concern.
We first look at the performance of not-connected stocks traded by these broker-affiliated
mutual funds in the same quarter as their trades on connected stocks. A typical broker-
affiliated fund holds positions across many stocks, and only a few of these are connected
to the fund through the inside brokerage relation. If the superior performance of broker-
affiliated funds’ trading on connected stocks comes from their general stock-picking skill
– even time-varying stock-picking skill – we should find similar out-performance for these
simultaneous not-connected stock trades as well. To test this, we construct a similar calendar-
time long/short portfolio. The strategy goes long (short) in the not-connected stocks that the
broker-affiliated funds’ buy (sell) more aggressively than their non-affiliated peers, measured
at the same quarter as our baseline portfolio strategy (in which we looked at similar trading
differences with connected stocks). We then examine the abnormal performance of this long-
short portfolio. To clarify, then, this portfolio looks at the same affiliated funds’ trading
as our baseline, at the same time as their trading in connected stocks which we showed is
predictive; but this time uses not-connected stocks only.
Table 5, Panel A reports the results. We see that these portfolio abnormal returns
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are both magnitude and significance-wise close to zero, regardless of the benchmark model
used.11 So time-varying skills or effort of affiliated versus other fund managers cannot explain
our results in Table 4.
In Table 5, Panel B we examine funds’ trades in stocks for which an insider traded through
their affiliated brokerage in the past, but has not traded in recent times. We construct a
long-short portfolio strategy similar to the one described above, based on differences in
trading of once-affiliated funds and their never-affiliated peers. So, in this test, we keep the
fund-stock pair the same, and look at the fund’s performance on the once-connected stock
in periods without an affiliated-broker-facilitated insider trading link. Again, results are both
economically and statistically negligible.
Our second set of falsification tests considers breaks in the funds-firm connection due to
(1) insiders changing brokers and (2) insiders changing jobs, similar in spirit to our falsifi-
cation tests on analyst forecasts in section 4.1.2. We then examine the trading performance
of broker-affiliated funds on stocks that used to be connected through the inside broker link
but are not anymore.
Consider first the case where the insider switches to a different broker to execute his
trades but stays at the same firm. We create a calendar-time portfolio based on the abnormal
trading of broker-affiliated funds relative to non-affiliated funds on the insider’s firm following
the quarter in which the insider trades through the new broker. These results are reported
in Panel A of Table 6. As we can see, the abnormal returns to this long/short portfolio
are all close to zero and statistically not significant. The magnitude of abnormal returns is
economically negligible, and sometimes it has the wrong sign, compared to what we observe
for the truly connected stocks in Table 4.
Our last falsification test is based on the insider moving to a new firm but retaining his
old broker for trade execution. We create a calendar-time portfolio based on the abnormal
trading of broker-affiliated funds relative to non-affiliated funds on the previously connected
stock following a trade by an unconnected insider at the same firm (who does not trade
through this fund’s brokerage). The results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. The abnor-
mal returns to this long/short portfolio are again economically small and statistically not
significant.
11Given the similarity of results, we do not report results for the Fama-French five-factor or the Q-factor
model here, both to save space and, more importantly, to focus on results where we give these placebos the
best chance to go against us.
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In summary, our many falsification tests all reinforce the notion that the channel through
which the broker-affiliated funds obtain their information advantage is the insiders’ brokerage
relationship.
4.3 Does the market understand the connected analyst’s informa-
tion advantage?
Our results in the previous section indicate that the market in general does not appreciate the
time-varying value of the brokerage affiliation.12 To be consistent with our overall evidence,
then, we should also find that the market does not completely figure out that connected
analysts’ opinions are relatively more valuable in periods when the insider trades through
her brokerage.
4.3.1 Market reactions to connected analysts’ recommendation changes
A large literature in finance and accounting documents that the stock market reacts strongly
when analysts revise their earnings forecasts or change their recommendations (Stickel (1991),
Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). Given that connected ana-
lysts are more accurate, one question that naturally arises is whether the market pays more
attention to their recommendations. If it did, then we would expect prices to react more
strongly to recommendation changes by connected analysts in periods when they are better
informed due to the insider having traded through their brokerage.
To test this, we examine cumulative abnormal returns around analyst recommendation
change dates. We take the market reaction to recommendation changes by connected an-
alysts, relative to other non-connected analysts who forecast at the same time (quarter),
to design this test. However, stopping here is not enough. Even if there is a difference in
the market reactions, this could arise due to the connected analyst being better than the
others on average, and it may not reflect the market understanding that the connected an-
alyst is differentially informed only at specific and predictable times – after an insider has
traded through the analyst’s brokerage. To take care of this, we construct a pseudo-connect
abnormal return measure, which is the difference in the market reaction to the connected
analyst relative to that for other analysts, but measured in periods without an affiliated-
broker-facilitated insider trading link. Finally, we examine the difference-in-differences of the
12Or even if it does, some friction prevents it from trading all potential profits away.
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market reaction (the difference between abnormal returns to connected and not-connected
recommendation changes in periods when the insider traded through her brokerage, minus
this same quantity measured when the insider did not trade). The results are presented in
Panel A of Table 7 for upgrades and in Panel B for downgrades.
We see that in general the market reacts more to recommendation changes by connected
analysts than to those of other analysts, irrespective of whether the period is after an in-
sider trade or not. Therefore, the aforementioned difference-in-difference coefficient is not
statistically significant.
Another way of testing this hypothesis is by running a panel regression of the three-day
cumulative abnormal returns around analyst recommendation change (CAR (-1, +1)) on the
connect dummy and controlling for firm-year, analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year fixed
effects:
CARi,j,t(−1,+1) = β1Connecti,j,t + β1Recom age+ paired HDFE + i,j,t (3)
We get similar results as above using this specification, which we present in Table 7 in
the IA.
Overall, this suggests that the market identifies that inside analysts are on average more
informed. This is perhaps not surprising, since connected analysts’ recommendations are
likely to be more valuable than other analysts’ in periods in which the insider trades through
her brokerage, and no less valuable in other periods – making her average track record better.
This average track record is easy to calculate, and hence the market does react more on
average when the connected analyst changes her recommendation.
But, crucially, the market does not seem to recognize the source of the inside analyst’s
advantage – that this comparative information advantage arises only in periods after the
insider trades through her brokerage. In the following sub-section, we design a trading
strategy to examine whether this is indeed an oversight. To show that it is, we need to
demonstrate that there is money left on the table to be earned following connected analyst’s
recommendations in periods following insider trades, relative to all other periods.
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4.3.2 Predictability of earnings announcement returns
We know from the previous section that the market does not react differently to inside
analyst recommendations in periods when the analyst is likely to be more informed. Is
this evidence of under-reaction? To investigate, we examine 3-day earnings announcement
returns following the recommendation change. We focus on earnings announcement day
returns instead of general trading days because returns around earnings announcement have
a higher signal-to-noise ratio – if there is inside information, its implication will likely become
public when the company announces its earnings. We also separate the recommendations
into those more favorable than the consensus view (positive) and those less favorable than
the consensus (negative). These results are reported in Table 8. For the average connected
analyst whose recommendation is more positive than the consensus, the 3-day CAR around
the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement is 0.83%. However, the average 3-day CAR
around earnings announcements for the same analyst in periods not following insider trades
0.87%. Therefore, there is no difference in this case.
The picture is quite different when we consider whether the connected analyst is more
negative than the consensus. A relatively more negative view from a connected analyst is
associated with a 0.56% lower return around the next earnings announcement day in peri-
ods when she is better informed, compared to similar recommendations from her in periods
when she is not informed. This effect is statistically significant (t = -2.10) and holds even
if we examine DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns around the earnings announcement. So
the market price does not seem to fully reflect the incremental value of the inside analyst’s
recommendation following an insider trade through her brokerage, particularly when the
recommendation is more negative than the consensus. This could reflect the fact that the
market does not fully appreciate that the inside analyst’s information advantage is concen-
trated in these periods.
These results are consistent with those on affiliated-mutual-fund-trading-based profits.
Again, the information advantage seems strong only on the short leg, when the inside analyst
is more negative than the prevailing consensus. Just as in the previous case, one could
argue that these results are also consistent with the view that the market does appreciate
the source of such higher profitability of inside analyst recommendations, but short-sales
frictions prevent it from trading all such profits away. While we cannot completely rule this
out, again this seems less likely in light of our results in the previous section (i.e., that the
market reacts similarly to recommendation changes of inside analysts in periods following
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and not following insider trades), and also, again, because our sample firms are typically
tilted towards large firms where short sales constraints are less likely to be binding.
5 Cross-sectional heterogeneity
5.1 Affiliated analysts
Here we examine under what circumstances the inside analyst’s information advantage would
be most useful. All regressions here are run with subsample-indicators interacted with the
connect dummy in specification (2), and therefore they retain the structure of our baseline
tests, including the paired fixed effects. Also, in our cross-sectional tests, we discuss all
economic magnitudes with reference to the average PAFE in the relevant sub-sample, e.g.,
when we discuss differences in result magnitudes between small and large firm-samples, we
benchmark the small-firm coefficient to the mean PAFE for analysts forecasting small-firm
earnings.
5.1.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure: Before vs. After
After the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (henceforth Regulation FD) in year 2000, firm
managers are not allowed to selectively disclose material non-public information to analysts
and large institutional investors. Indeed, many studies (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy
(2010)) find that Regulation FD has effectively curbed the information advantage analysts
enjoyed through access to management in the pre-Regulation FD period. It is interesting to
examine what happens to the information advantage the connected analysts have from their
brokerage-affiliated insider trading after Regulation FD.
One possibility is that Regulation FD curtailed direct channels through which analysts
might have had private access to management, but left the inside broker advantage relatively
unaffected. This is because with the inside broker channel, the manager is not necessarily
deliberately disclosing any material information selectively to the connected analyst. The
manager interacts with staff members from the trading desk, and the analyst infers the
information through them. This would mean that the inside broker’s relative advantage
should actually be stronger after Regulation FD.
To test this, we define a time dummy postFD equal to 1 for all analyst forecasts issued
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after the year 2001, and interact it with the connect dummy. These results are reported
in Panel A of Table 9. The connect postFD interaction has a coefficient of -0.097 (t=-2.95,
a 11.3% reduction relative to the sample mean), while the connect preFD has a coefficient
close to 0. This is consistent with our prior that the channel through which our connected
analysts become more accurate is not affected by Regulation FD. The insignificant coefficient
on the connect dummy before the Regulation FD period is also not surprising, since other
non-connected analysts could also have enjoyed access to inside information through direct
interactions with firm management before FD.
5.1.2 Which analysts?
Our hypothesis is that analysts employed at the inside broker obtain non-public information
on insider trades through their relationship with their colleagues at the brokerage’s trading
desks. Developing a good relationship takes time. Hence we expect our results to be weaker
when the connected analyst has joined the brokerage firm recently and is unlikely to have
established a strong relationship with her colleagues who interact with insider-clients. To
test this, we create a dummy, Early2 (Early3 ), indicating whether the analyst is within
the first two (three) years of joining this brokerage firm, and interact it with the connect
dummy. These results are reported in the first four rows of Table 9, Panel B. Consistent with
our hypothesis, the coefficient on the connect dummy is less pronounced and not significant
when the analyst has worked at her current firm for less than two or three years. This
result supports our hypothesis about the time it takes to develop a relationship with work
colleagues in a different division.
The second analyst characteristic we examine is the number of stocks in the connected
analyst’s coverage portfolio. Clement (1999) argues that analysts have deeper knowledge
and insights on a specific firm when they have fewer stocks to cover. This type of expertise
might also be crucial for a connected analyst to correctly infer the information contained
in insider trades. For example, if the broker learns from the telephone number that the
connected CEO is calling from India to make a trade, a connected analyst who knows that
the firm is considering an acquisition in India might be able to infer its progress. If the
analyst did not know this information, such an inference would not be possible. We thus
expect that the information our connected analysts gain access to will be more useful when
the analyst has fewer stocks to cover. We create a dummy, One-of-few, equal to 1 when the
number of stocks covered is below that of the sample median analyst, and we interact it with
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the connect dummy. The results are reported in rows 5 and 6 of the panel. The coefficient
on the Connect one-of-few dummy is -0.105 (t=-2.99), implying a 14.4% reduction in error,
while that on the Connect one-of-many (=1-One-of-few) dummy is -0.054 (t=-1.66, a 7.3%
reduction relative to the sample mean). These results support the hypothesis that being
focused helps connected analysts better interpret the information contained in the insider
trade.
We also examine whether the effect of being connected on analyst forecast accuracy
depends on analysts’ skill. On the one hand, skilled analysts may be in a better position
to exploit the information advantage through inside brokers since they could combine their
unique insights with the additional information and generate more accurate forecasts. On
the other hand, our regression specification controls for analyst-firm fixed effects, so we are
essentially comparing the forecast accuracy of the connected analyst on the same firm in
periods when the insider trades versus when he did not trade. The improvement in forecast
accuracy may be small for more skilled analysts because they tend to do well even in periods
when insiders did not trade. Moreover, less-skilled analysts who understand that they are
not otherwise good at forecasting earnings might be especially incentivized to exploit any
information edge within their reach to improve upon their forecasts.
To test this, we measure analyst skill as the percentile ranking of the analyst’s forecast
error on other firms relative to all other analysts following the same firms in the same year.
We then calculate the average ranking in terms of forecast error across all non-connected
firms followed by the analyst in the previous year. The dummy variable High skill is equal
to 1 if the analyst has a below median ranking in terms of past forecast error. We then
regress PAFE on the interaction term between connect and our analyst skill dummy, and
report the results in rows 7 and 8 of Table 9, Panel B. As we can see, the coefficient on the
connect dummy is significantly larger when the analyst is less skilled, and statistically much
stronger. This result indicates that insider information is more useful for connected analysts
with lower skill.
Our results rely on the assumption that connected analysts can get access to additional
information contained in insider trading beyond what is disclosed in public SEC filings. The
information advantage comes from connected analysts’ interaction with their trading desk
colleague who executes an insider’s trades.
To substantiate this assumption, we conduct a geography-based test. The idea is that
an analyst who is geographically co-located with their trading desk colleague would perhaps
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have a closer relationship with him, enabling her (the analyst) to exploit the inside broker
advantage better. To test this, we create a dummy Sameloc equal to 1 if the analyst and
the insider who trades through her brokerage firm are located in the same Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA). We use the insider’s location to approximate the broker’s location
since location information is available only for the insider, and the broker assigned by the
brokerage firm is almost always located close to the trading client (which we verify by
examining a 5% random sample of forms manually). We then regress PAFE on the interaction
of connect and the same location dummy. This result is reported in rows 9 and 10 of Table
9, Panel B. The coefficient on the connect dummy is 3.5 times as large when the analyst and
insider are from the same MSA, as compared to when they are not located in the same city.
This supports our premise that geographic proximity facilitates information flows between
the connected analyst and their trading desk colleague who facilitates the insider rade.13
Finally, we examine residual analyst coverage, i.e., coverage controlling for size. We
find that the absolute magnitude of the connect dummy is larger in firms with high residual
analyst coverage, although statistically they are similar. This result is consistent with a com-
petition effect: if we control for the information environment through firm size, when more
analysts cover the same stock, there is more competition (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)).
This strengthens incentives for the connected analyst to use all possible information to im-
prove her forecast.
5.1.3 Insider trade and insider’s firm characteristics
The first firm characteristic we look at is market capitalization, which has often been used
as a proxy for a firm’s information environment. Small firms are less likely to be held
by institutional investors, and are followed by fewer analysts. Empirically, perhaps as a
result of this, information diffusion speed is slower for smaller firms (Hong, Lim, and Stein
(2000)). Previous research also documents that outsiders mimicking insider trades are earn
more profits in firms with smaller market capitalization (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). We
13In results we do not present here to save space, we show that this last test is not driven by the analyst
being located close to the firm headquarters where the insider works. Prior literature has shown that local
analysts have an information advantage not necessarily related to the channel we focus on (Malloy (2005)).
While the analyst-firm fixed effects take this into account, if such an advantage arises especially at the times
when insiders trade, this possibility is not ruled out or controlled for by our main empirical design. Our
evidence, however, assures us that this is not the case – the inside analyst’s forecast remains more accurate
than those of others when we focus on analysts co-located with insiders who do not reside where the firm is
headquartered. For example, 52% of outside directors, and 73% of large shareholders, live outside the MSA
where the firm is headquartered, and their trades help us rule out this possibility.
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thus expect that the information obtained through the inside broker connection is more
useful among small firms. To test this, we interact the connect dummy with a size dummy
indicating whether the firm has above or below median market capitalization, where market
capitalization is defined as the firm’s market value of equity 12 months prior to the forecast
announcement date. These results are reported in the first two rows of Table 9, Panel
C. Consistent with our prior, both the magnitude and significance of the connect dummy
are stronger for small firms (coefficient of -0.17, t=-3.49, a 13.9% reduction relative to the
sample mean), while the coefficient on Connect bigfirm is close to zero and not significant
at conventional levels.
Again, the private information obtained via insider trading transactions could be more
useful to the connected analysts when there is more underlying uncertainty about the firms’
future prospects. To test this, we use two variables, monthly return volatility and analyst
forecast dispersion, to proxy for information uncertainty about firms’ future performance.
We again interact the connect dummy with a dummy indicating whether the firm has above
or below median monthly return volatility or analyst forecast dispersion.14 Return volatility
results are reported in rows 3 and 4, and forecast dispersion results in rows 5 and 6, of Table 9,
Panel C. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the coefficient on the connect dummy
is indeed more pronounced for firms with more volatile stock returns or more dispersed
opinions. For example, the coefficient on the connect dummy is -0.15 (t=-3.03, a 13.4%
reduction relative to sample mean) when the firm has above median return volatility, while
it is only -0.02 (t=-1.01) for less volatile stocks. In the next two rows, we use monthly stock
turnover to proxy for investors’ (rather than analysts’) difference of opinion (Hong and Stein
(2007)). Again, we find the evidence to be consistent with our hypothesis. The connect
dummy is strongly negative in high turnover stocks, with a coefficient of -0.13 (t=-2.86, a
14.5% reduction relative to the sample mean), but it is much smaller in magnitude and not
statistically significant in low turnover stocks.
Analyst coverage is a commonly used proxy for firms’ information environment. Firms
with lower analyst coverage tend to be less transparent, and information diffuses more slowly
in such firms (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)). In rows 9 and 10 of Table 9, Panel C, we regress
PAFE on the interaction between connect and another dummy indicating above or below
median analyst coverage. Given the strong correlation between analyst coverage and size, we
expect the connect dummy to be more pronounced among firms with lower analyst coverage.
This is indeed what we find.
14We leave out the connected analysts’ forecasts when calculating the analyst forecast dispersion measure.
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We also split the sample based on firms’ median book-to-market ratios. Firms with low
B/M ratios have higher growth opportunities, for which information asymmetry is typically
assumed to be higher than that for assets in place. So we expect inside information to be
particularly useful for connected analysts among such stocks. The last firm characteristic
we look at is R&D intensity. Firms with high R&D expenditures are inherently difficult
to value, given the uncertainty associated with the innovation process, and the expertise
required to value it. Analysts who face the challenging task of forecasting earnings of high
R&D firms might benefit more from the information obtained through their inside broker
connection. Our results are consistent with both these hypotheses.
Next, the information advantage of the connected analysts over other analysts crucially
depends on how informative the connected insider trades are for future firm value. The
insider trading literature has documented that not all insider trades are equally informative.
In the next set of tests, we screen out informative insider trades based on observable trade
characteristics, and test whether more informative insider trades lead to more accurate earn-
ings forecasts for connected analysts. First, we examine the total number of trades placed
through the one-year period up to the analysts’ forecast announcement date. The dummy
Fretrade (Infretrade) is equal to 1 if the total number of insider trades is above (below) the
median, and we interact it with the connect dummy. These results are reported in rows 15
and 16 of Table 9, Panel C. The coefficient on the connect dummy is significantly negative
only when insiders trade less frequently through this connected brokerage house. The final
trade characteristic we look at is the size of the insider trade as a fraction of total shares
outstanding. Larger trades are more likely to have information. To test this, we interact
the connect dummy with a dummy indicating whether the average trade size for connected
insiders is above or below median. The last two rows of the Panel report these results. The
coefficient on the connect dummy is two times larger when the average trade size is above
the median.
Overall, then, we find that larger and rarer trades give a bigger edge to the inside analyst.
5.2 Affiliated mutual funds
Having established that broker-affiliated funds are able to trade on the privileged informa-
tion contained in insider trades facilitated by their firm for their own benefit, we examine
various firm, fund, and trade characteristics that could amplify the broker-affiliated funds’
information advantage. We use the same set of firm and trade characteristics as in our tests
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on connected analysts’ forecast accuracy in section 4.1.1.
The firm characteristics we examine include firm size, book-to-market ratio, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, and monthly turnover. Following our conjecture
in section 5.1, we expect the information advantage of broker-affiliated funds to be more
pronounced among small stocks, stocks with high growth opportunity, more volatile stocks,
and stocks with highly dispersed analyst and investor opinions. Each month, we first divide
all stocks into two groups based on the median value of a specific stock characteristic. We
then construct the same calendar-time portfolio strategy and examine the Carhart (1997)
four-factor alpha for each subsample, similar to our baseline results in Section 4.2. The only
difference is that we now only require each portfolio to contain at least 15 stocks, and invest
in risk-free asset in periods of less than 15 stocks (imposing a stricter criterion of 30 stocks
in the portfolio reduces power in our subsamples, without affecting results qualitatively).
The results are reported in Table 10. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the
abnormal return to broker-affiliated funds’ trading is concentrated among stocks where we
expect their information advantage will be largest. For example, in rows (1) and (2) when
we split the sample based on firm size, the monthly four-factor alpha is 0.85% for small
stocks, but only 0.02% for big stocks. Similarly, the abnormal return to broker-affiliated
funds’ trading is higher for growth stocks, more volatile stocks, and stocks with high forecast
dispersion and turnover.
Next we examine trade-level characteristics that could indicate more informative insider
trades. First, we measure the total number of trades placed through the insider’s brokerage.
We split the sample into two based on the median number of insider trades. The abnormal
return to broker-affiliated funds’ trading is economically larger and more significant when
insiders trade less frequently through the connected brokerage house. Bigger trades also lead
to higher abnormal returns (rows 15 through 18 in Table 10). Overall, we find that larger
and less frequent trades give a bigger edge to the broker-affiliated funds, which is consistent
with our results on the connected analysts’ forecast accuracy.
Finally, we examine the strength of results across different kinds of fund managers. We
split the sample into two based on the number of other managers within the same fund family.
Managers who face internal competition from other managers are likely to have a greater
incentive to exploit the information advantage from the broker of the insider. Accordingly, we
find that abnormal returns to broker-affiliated fund managers are larger when the manager
faces internal competition from many other managers. Fund managers with longer tenure
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(two years or more in the family) are more likely to have established a stronger relationship
with the broker through whom they get the information about the nature of the insider’s
trade. Consistent with this, we find that fund managers who have spent more time in the
same fund family show greater economic magnitude of abnormal returns to their trades.
6 The inside broker’s information advantage: Chan-
nels
We gave an example in the introduction on the nature of the trading instruction – limit orders
versus market – being one potential source of the inside broker’s information advantage.
Clearly, however, this is not the only possible source of such an advantage. Many other
channels could also convey similarly valuable information: for example, the broker might
know whether the sale of inside stock was accompanied by sales of other, unrelated stocks
that the insider owns. This additional piece of information, which the broker might possess
purely incidentally, and which again the market would not have – could be helpful in inferring
whether the trade was more likely to have been information driven or due to liquidity reasons.
In addition, the broker might become aware of other kinds of information in the process
of his interaction with the insider, such as whether the sale was motivated by a desire to
purchase some asset, like a house or a yacht. It is also possible that the broker will be privy
to information on whether the insider’s family members, for example, his children or wife
– who might also have brokerage accounts with him – also traded at the same time and in
the same direction as the insider. Yet another possibility is that the broker can infer from
vocal cues or body language the insider’s views on some aspects of the company’s business
(Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012)). In sum, there are various clear reasons why one might
expect the insider’s broker to be privy to information that would help him understand the
motives behind the trade better than anyone else.
Although it is difficult to find direct evidence on many of these channels, there is testimo-
nial evidence in favor of at least one of the channels we mentioned above – that of the broker
figuring out information from trades made by the insider’s family members at the same time
as the insider – in the case involving ImClone Systems. The ImClone insider trading scandal
resulted in a widely publicized criminal case and prison terms for media celebrity Martha
Stewart, ImClone chief executive officer Samuel D. Waksal and Stewart’s broker at Merrill
Lynch, Peter Bacanovic, who inferred bad news from trades made simultaneously by Waksal
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and his other family members.
6.1 Test of a channel for broker-affiliated funds
In general it is difficult to show definitive evidence of what the broker might know that is
informative for the inside analyst but not for the rest of the market after the trade has been
disclosed. There could be things that the broker knows but the empiricist never finds out. All
we can do is to look for evidence of the following nature: something that eventually becomes
clear to everyone including non-connected analysts (we need this for us as econometricians
to observe the pattern), that only the inside analyst could have known earlier – i.e., at the
time of the trade itself – giving him a clear advantage at that time.
One example is the start of a repeated trading pattern. Suppose the insider starts trading
in the same month every year. This would become clear to all participants only after a few
consecutive years. However, it is possible that the broker knew that this was the insider’s
plan right when he implemented the first or second trade according to the pattern. In this
section, we test this hypothesis.
We identify routine trades following Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) as insider trades
that occur in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. We then define a dummy
variable indicating whether a given insider trade is routine or otherwise, which we call
opportunistic. Within all routine trades, we further define three dummies to differentiate
between routine trades that occur for the first time in the sequence, for the second time in
the sequence, and three or more years into the sequence. Using these measures, we examine
the quarterly change in broker-affiliated funds’ holdings relative to non-affiliated funds’ on
stocks associated with Form 144 trades.
First, consider an insider trade that constitutes the beginning of a routine sequence.
After the insider trades, we should observe that fund managers not affiliated with the inside
broker – who have no way to figure out that this trade belongs to a sequence that they
will see in the future, and therefore think this is an information-driven opportunistic trade
– negatively update their prior beliefs about the prospects of the insider’s stock, which is
likely to be reflected in significant sales of their holdings. Now, if the affiliated manager
knows that this is the start of a sequence, he should be much less negative, i.e., not sell as
much. Now consider the same insider’s trades later in the sequence, i.e., trades in the same
month in subsequent years. By this time affiliated and not-affiliated managers would both
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be able to infer that these are likely-to-be-uninformative sequence trades, and they would
trade similarly.
These results are reported in Table 11, Panel A. Consistent with our prior, we find that
the difference in quarterly trading on connected stocks between affiliated and non-affiliated
funds decreases monotonically from the first-in-sequence trade to the third-or-further-in-
a-sequence trade. While non-affiliated funds decrease holding 0.025% (t=2.56) more than
affiliated funds following the first-year routine trades, the difference becomes smaller and
insignificant following the second-year routine trades. The difference further decreases to
close to zero following the third-year (or beyond) routine trades. Since only the broker-
affiliated funds are likely to know that the first trade belongs to a regular trading pattern,
their information advantage over non-affiliated funds should be largest at such times. Finally,
inside broker-affiliated funds trade more negatively than peers when the trade is indeed
opportunistic, suggesting that they are better able to sort out opportunistic trades from
potentially repeated ones.
In Panel B, we verify that the direction in which the affiliated funds trade is indeed
profitable. First, we show that routine insider trades are not informative of declines in
future firm value (reminiscent of, and out-of-sample validation for Cohen et al. (2012), who
establish this pattern for Form 4 insider trades). Therefore, by not aggressively selling the
insider’s firm following these trades – including the first-in-sequence trade, as shown in Panel
A – affiliated funds avoid unnecessary trading costs. On the other hand, non-routine Form
144 trades do predict negative future returns on average, so broker-affiliated funds avoid
significant losses by selling these stocks more aggressively than their peers (last row of Panel
A).
6.2 Verifying the channel for connected analysts
Here we again use our previously defined dummies differentiating between routine trades
that occur for the first time in the sequence, for the second time in the sequence, and three
or more years into the sequence. Specifically, we regress (i) an analyst forecast optimism
(signed forecast error) measure (column (1) of Table 12), and (ii) our previous forecast
accuracy measure (column (2)), on the interaction between these four dummies and the
connect dummy.
Looking at the analyst forecast optimism measure, we find that for routine trades, the
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coefficient on the connect dummy is positive for the first-in-sequence trade. This shows
that connected analysts remain significantly more positive than their peers about the future
prospects of the insider’s firm after observing the first-in-sequence trade. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that the connected analyst is the only one who knows that the first-
in-sequence insider trade is uninformative. There is no significant difference between their
optimism and that of their peers for further-in-sequence trades.
Again, a consistent pattern emerges when we examine forecast accuracy in column (2)
using our PAFE measure. Here the coefficient on the connect dummy monotonically de-
creases from the first-in-a-sequence trade to the third-or-further-in-a-sequence trade. While
the connect coefficient is -0.10 and significant at the 10% level following the first-year rou-
tine trades, it is smaller and becomes insignificant following the second-year routine trades.
The coefficient on the connect dummy even becomes positive following the third-year (or
beyond) routine trades. The economic magnitude of the connect coefficient on the first-year
routine trade is even larger than that of the opportunistic trades, though statistically it is
less significant due to the smaller sample size.15 Like our results on affiliated mutual funds,
these results convey a clear message: since only the connected analyst is likely to know
that the first trade belongs to a regular trading pattern, their information advantage over
non-connected analysts is the largest at such times, and declines thereafter.
Overall, both the affiliated fund and the affiliated analyst results support our conjecture
that inside analysts indeed get information beyond that contained in the public disclosure
of the trade itself.
The results in this section help rule out an important alternative – that of reverse causal-
ity. The reverse causality argument here is that at certain points in time, the connected
analyst (or fund manager) has a particular information or analysis advantage over everyone
else. At these times, she issues better forecasts (or trades in the right direction), and the
inside broker, learning from his analyst (or fund manager) colleague, advises the insider to
trade in the same direction. In that case, the effect we capture would be spurious.
But our example of the first-in-sequence trade above is one that is not particularly in-
formed by anything at the firm; still, the inside analyst and fund manager know something
more than the market. There is nothing here that they could have known beyond the fact
that this trade will be part of a sequence, and hence, while their compatriots who do not
15There are 915 observations on connected first-in-a-sequence trades, 961 observations on connected second-
in-a-sequence trades, 938 observations on connected further-in-a-sequence trades, and 15,379 observations
on connected non-routine trades.
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know this might think it is informative, they know it is not. In fact, it is this lack of infor-
mativeness of the trade that is their information advantage. This is not a trading idea that
could plausibly have originated from the analyst or the manager.
7 Legality: A discussion
One natural question is whether the effect we document implies some illegal behavior. With
regard to the laws surrounding insider trading and related issues, this depends on two ques-
tions: (i) whether the analyst/fund manager obtained material non-public information, and
(ii) whether the analyst/fund manager selectively disclosed it or traded on it to her own
benefit. In our context, the information that the analyst obtains by talking to the broker
of the insider may not be material. Broadly speaking, a piece of information is “material”
if it would cause a reasonable investor to make a buy or sell decision. For example, infor-
mation that a company is not doing well and is likely to announce large losses later in the
year would be considered material. Now consider a case where it is publicly known that a
company plans to expand internationally, but the countries where it plans to expand are not
known. Suppose that the broker of the insider learns that the insider is making frequent
trips to China. By talking to the broker, the analyst or the fund manager guesses – cor-
rectly – that the company is likely to launch its products in China. This information is not
necessarily material, because even if this information were given to an investor, she may not
know whether this is good news or bad, and therefore, whether she should buy or sell the
stock. On the other hand, if the analyst obtains this information, she can spend more time
and resources doing research on the likely demand for the company’s products in China. As
a result, she could gain a valuable information advantage about the future prospects of the
company than is publicly known at that time. Doing so would not be illegal.
Even if the information obtained by the analyst or the fund manager is material, e.g.,
that the company is likely to announce large losses for the year, the behavior of the analyst
we document may not necessarily be illegal, per se. If the analyst does not herself trade
on this information, and discloses it for the first time in her publicly disseminated report,
then there is nothing illegal about it. This is because whenever someone does come into
possession of material non-public information, public disclosure of that information absolves
her of any legal liabilities, at least with regard to insider-trading related issues.
On the other hand, if the analyst comes into possession of information that is considered
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material, and before making this information public, she tips off certain selective clients
(e.g., Irvine et al. (2007)) or her in-house fund manager who then trade on this information
to their benefit, this would be considered a tipping chain. This is illegal if every link in
the chain knew that the previous person in the chain had violated her fiduciary duty when
she passed on the information, if the information was material and non-public, and if she
deliberately trades on or passes this information further to obtain some (even non-monetary)
benefit.
In case of the fund manager, if the information she obtains is material and she trades
based on it, that would indeed be illegal. There is, however, an exception. The fund manager
could obtain information about a large insider sale, which is observed by everyone and likely
to be construed as bad news, but is in fact not so (e.g., a first-in-a-regular-sequence trade).
In this case, she would choose not to sell her holdings in the company when other fund
managers are doing so. Although the information in this case is material, using it to not
trade is, in fact, not considered illegal according to the the current laws.
Our earlier results, however, show that when the affiliated fund managers sell connected
stocks more than others, the stock subsequently underperforms. Since the information is be-
ing exploited by the managers by selling more relative to others, any specifically identifiable
instance of this general behavior would be considered illegal according to the current laws.
Even if not all of our results necessarily imply illegal behavior, they do point to an
information advantage for the inside broker. As discussed earlier, the possibility of other
illegal activities remains, and warrants – at the very least – more attention from insider
trading law enforcement agencies.
8 Conclusion
Insiders are privy to information about their firms. How does this information get gradually
incorporated into prices? Various regulations have been designed and enforced to ensure
that this process does not create any unfair advantages for any party involved. As part of
such regulations, for example, insiders are required to disclose their precise trades. But does
this disclosure make all parties outside the firm equally informed about the motives behind
the trade? In this paper, we argue that it does not.
We identify the stock broking house that firm insiders trade through from a form filed
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with the SEC, and show that analysts and fund managers employed at such ‘inside brokers’
know better. These connected analysts’ forecasts are significantly more accurate, and the
connected managers’ trades are more profitable than those of their competitors – each of
whom can, incidentally, observe the regulatory disclosure of the trade itself. They are also
more accurate than their own forecasts or trades in the same stock in any other period when
the insider does not trade through the affiliated broker.
Our study has important implications for the role of financial intermediaries in the pro-
cess of assimilating information into prices. Broking houses, for example, might have an
information advantage that they can obtain from their inferences based on the nature of
trading instructions from clients – and clients may not only mean firm insiders.
Since almost all traders – not just corporate insiders – trade through brokers, the in-
formation advantage the broker enjoys in her role as a trading intermediary could be more
general. For example, when an activist hedge fund is slowly acquiring shares in a company,
the fund’s broker would have this information before any filing of 13D forms, which is when
such information typically becomes public. Even after the knowledge that an activist hedge
fund is acquiring a significant stake in a company becomes public, the broker might still
retain an information advantage. For example, through her interactions she may be able
to glean information on the level of the hedge fund’s commitment – is the fund manager
looking to make substantial changes to the company and willing to commit resources to an
expensive proxy battle, if needed, or would she likely back down later and be satisfied with
token concessions given by the management? Overall, while we focus on insiders in this
paper, examining the brokers’ information advantage in other contexts might be a fruitful
avenue for future research.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample, including number of observations, mean, 25th percentile, 
median and 75th percentile for all the variables used in the analysis. Panel A reports number of observations, 
mean, 10th percentile, median and 90th percentile for the variables in Form 144 trades. Multiple trades of the 
same insider on the same date are treated as one. Variables used in Panels B through F are defined as follows. 
Percentage absolute forecast error (PAFE) is defined as the absolute value of actual EPS minus analyst forecasted 
EPS, scaled by stock price and multiplied by 100.  Percentage signed forecast error (PFE) is the actual EPS minus 
analyst forecasted EPS, scaled by stock price and multiplied by 100. Connect is a dummy equal to 1 if the analyst 
issues an earnings forecast on a stock within 1 year after the firm’s insiders trade through a brokerage house 
employing this analyst. Affiliation (affil) is a dummy equal to 1 if an analyst issues an earnings forecast on a stock 
within 1 year after its IPO or SEO date for which her brokerage house is the lead underwriter for the IPO or 
SEO. Forecast age (fore_age) is the natural log of the number of days between the forecast announcement and 
earnings announcement date. The size of insider trades (frac_shrout) is the average number of shares traded by 
connected insiders as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Number of trades (No_of_trades) is the total 
number of insider trades that occurred during the period from 1 year prior to the earnings announcement to the 
forecast announcement day for the connected forecast. Post Regulation FD (postregfd) is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the forecast is announced after year 2001. Market capitalization (mktcap) is the firm’s market value of equity 12 
month before the earnings announcement date. Book-to-market ratio (logBM) is the natural log of book value of 
equity over market value of equity ending in December. Monthly stock volatility (vol) is the rolling standard 
deviation of the past 36 months’ return. Analyst forecast dispersion (disp) is the standard deviation of annual EPS 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average outstanding forecasts, following Diether, Malloy and 
Scherbina (2002). We remove the connected analysts’ forecasts when calculating forecast dispersion. Analyst 
coverage (coverage) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering this firm at fiscal year. Stock 
turnover (turnover) is the monthly trading volume over total shares outstanding averaged over the past six 
months. Residual analyst coverage (rcoverage) is the residual from the month-by-month cross-sectional regression 
of log(1+Analysts) on log(Size) and a Nasdaq dummy, following Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). R&D intensity 
(R&D) is R&D expenses scaled by contemporaneous sales revenue. Number of years working (workyear) is the 
number of years the analyst has worked at this brokerage house up to the current year. Number of firms covered 
(numfirm) is the number of firms the analyst followed in a given year. In Panel B, we report the summary 
statistics for the sample when the connect dummy is equal to 1. In Panel C, we report the summary statistics for 
the pseudo-connect sample, defined as analyst-firm pairs that are connected at some point but not 
contemporaneously. Panel D reports the summary statistics for the entire Compustat sample for the same sample 
period. In Panel E, we report the summary statistics for cumulative abnormal returns around recommendation 
changes. CAR(0,+1) is the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns following recommendation change. Abnormal 
return is measured as raw return less either the CRSP value-weighted index return (market adjusted) or the Size-
Book-to-market-Momentum matched portfolio return (DGTW adjusted). Recom_age is the log number of days 
between recommendation announcement day and the most recent earnings announcement day. In Panel F, we 
report summary statistics for the broker-affiliated mutual funds sample. Broker-affiliated mutual funds are defined 
as all those mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage 
house. Expense is the annual expense ratio. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases 
of securities divided by the average twelve-month TNA of the fund. Manager tenure is the number of years since 
the current manager took control. Raw monthly return is the fund net return plus expenses.  
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Panel A: Form 144 trades 
 
  No. of obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
Number of insiders per company 11380 18 3 9 21 
Number of trades per company 11380 52 5 18 60 
Number of insiders per company-year 59462 6 1 3 7 
Number of trades per company-year 59462 10 2 5 11 
Number of shares traded per trade 591715 149676 3615 10036 34476 
Number of shares traded per trade (% of 
shares outstanding) 591715 0.758% 0.007% 0.026% 0.090% 
Value of shares traded per trade 591508 3056155 67284 250620 889140 
Value of shares traded per trade (%  of market 
cap) 591508 0.774% 0.007% 0.026% 0.093% 
Number of shares traded per company-year 59462 1489446 25485 109382 393370 
Number of shares traded per company-year (% 
of shares outstanding) 59462 7.538% 0.095% 0.385% 1.234% 
Value of shares traded per company-year 59452 30406714 287389 1633965 8461869 
Value of shares traded per company-year (% of 
market cap) 
 
59452 
 
7.717% 
 
0.096% 
 
0.391% 
 
1.269% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Full analyst forecast sample 
 
Variables No. of obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
PAFE 582183 1.18 0.05 0.16 0.54 
PFE 582183 -0.22 -0.09 0.03 0.21 
connect 600686 2.92% 0 0 0 
affil 600686 0.64% 0 0 0 
fore_age 600686 4.14 3.76 4.50 4.65 
frac_shrout 17570 0.20% 0.01% 0.03% 0.08% 
No_of_trades 17570 4.50 1.00 2.00 4.00 
postregfd 600686 0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00 
mktcap 516619 8836.63 457.65 1578.84 5730.99 
logBM 496283 -0.93 -1.39 -0.84 -0.37 
Vol 579748 11.94% 6.80% 9.93% 14.67% 
disp 540076 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.10 
turnover 554649 0.90% 0.32% 0.62% 1.13% 
coverage 532758 2.39 1.95 2.48 2.94 
rcoverage 532757 0.31 0.00 0.33 0.64 
R&D 264706 277.68% 0.47% 4.56% 14.72% 
workyear 600686 4.31 2.00 3.00 6.00 
Numfirm 
 
599995 
 
18 
 
11 
 
15 
 
21 
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Panel C: Connected forecast sample 
 
 
Variables No. of obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
PAFE 17240 0.68 0.03 0.11 0.35 
PFE 17240 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.17 
connect 17551 100.00% 1 1 1 
affil 17551 2.98% 0 0 0 
fore_age 17551 4.09 3.69 4.50 4.63 
frac_shrout 17570 0.20% 0.01% 0.03% 0.08% 
No_of_trades 17570 4.50 1.00 2.00 4.00 
postregfd 17551 0.71 0.00 1.00 1.00 
mktcap 16032 12907.83 759.33 2440.61 9081.80 
logBM 14900 -1.21 -1.69 -1.11 -0.60 
Vol 17122 13.90% 7.35% 11.06% 17.28% 
disp 16346 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.07 
turnover 16350 1.02% 0.44% 0.75% 1.26% 
coverage 16322 2.48 2.08 2.56 3.00 
rcoverage 16322 0.26 -0.05 0.28 0.57 
R&D 9473 386.64% 0.95% 9.12% 19.05% 
workyear 17551 5.03 2.00 4.00 7.00 
Numfirm 
 
17539 
 
16 
 
11 
 
16 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Pseudo-connect sample 
 
Variables No. of obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
PAFE 28880 0.72 0.03 0.11 0.35 
PFE 28880 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.18 
connect 29964 0% 0 0 0 
affil 29964 2.24% 0 0 0 
fore_age 29964 4.09 3.69 4.50 4.63 
No_of_trades 29964 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
postregfd 29964 0.69 0.00 1.00 1.00 
mktcap 27048 13011.54 974.23 3088.22 10039.90 
logBM 25982 -0.99 -1.46 -0.93 -0.44 
Vol 28789 11.59% 6.81% 9.76% 14.22% 
disp 27800 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.08 
turnover 27799 0.98% 0.40% 0.72% 1.25% 
coverage 27707 2.57 2.20 2.71 3.04 
rcoverage 27707 0.27 -0.04 0.29 0.60 
R&D 15101 361.86% 0.36% 4.46% 14.89% 
workyear 29964 5.07 2.00 4.00 7.00 
Numfirm 
 
29930 
 
17 
 
12 
 
16 
 
21 
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Panel E: Compustat sample 
 
Variables No. of obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
mktcap 43678 2993.95 65.19 271.05 1144.90 
logBM 43667 -0.74 -1.25 -0.66 -0.15 
Vol 62242 16.17% 8.55% 12.82% 19.32% 
Dispersion 36431 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.07 
Turnover 62824 0.62% 0.15% 0.37% 0.78% 
Coverage 64437 1.29 0.00 1.39 2.08 
Rcoverage 64436 0.03 -0.34 0.07 0.44 
R&D 
 
37143 
 
379.58% 
 
0.66% 
 
5.17% 
 
17.69% 
 
 
 
Panel F: Recommendation sample 
 
  Variables Measure  
No. of 
obs. Mean p25 Median p75 
 
downgrade CAR(0,+1) market adjusted 108599 -1.72% -3.53% -1.09% 0.81% 
 
CAR(0,+1) DGTW adjusted 108599 -1.53% -3.38% -1.04% 0.80% 
upgrade CAR(0,+1) market adjusted 118830 1.86% -0.88% 1.16% 3.74% 
  
CAR(0,+1) 
 
DGTW adjusted 
 
118830 
 
1.62% 
 
-0.87% 
 
1.09% 
 
3.56% 
 
 
 
Panel G: Broker-affiliated mutual fund sample 
 
  No. of obs. Mean P25 Median P75 
 
# of distinct stocks 
# of brokers with affiliated funds 
1533 
16         
# of affiliated funds per broker 16 13.4 3.5 8.0 25.0 
Total Net Assets (TNA, millions of USD) 215 387.14 37.21 146.43 410.30 
Expense 215 1.43% 1.10% 1.37% 1.79% 
Turnover 215 0.86 0.48 0.75 1.15 
Manager Tenure (months) 
 
215 
 
68 
 
29 
 
57 
 
98 
 
  
 
Affiliated MF Non-affiliated MF Diff 
 Raw Return Monthly 
 
0.65% 0.64% 0.01% 
 Net Return Monthly 
 
 
0.54% 
 
0.54% 
 
0.00% 
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Table 2: Forecast Accuracy of the Inside Broker-affiliated Analyst  
This table reports results from panel regressions of percentage analyst absolute forecast error (PAFE) on the 
connect dummy. In column (1), we control for firm, brokerage and year fixed effects. In column (2), we control 
for broker-firm and firm-year fixed effects. In column (3), we control for firm-year and analyst-broker-firm fixed 
effects. In column (4), we control for analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year and firm-year fixed effects. In 
column (5), we control for an affiliation dummy, forecast age, and analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year and 
firm-year fixed effects. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The sample includes 600,686 earnings forecasts 
from 1997 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered by firm, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate. ***, **, 
and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
connect -0.1540*** -0.0560*** -0.0667*** -0.0794*** -0.0756*** 
 
(-5.53) 
 
(-2.73) 
 
(-2.68) 
 
(-2.92) 
 
(-2.78) 
 
fore_age 
    
0.0506*** 
     
(6.00) 
 
affil 
    
-0.1622 
     
(-1.43) 
 
firm FE yes no no no no 
broker FE yes no no no no 
year FE yes no no no no 
broker-firm FE no yes no no no 
firm-year FE no yes yes yes yes 
analyst-broker-firm FE no no yes yes yes 
analyst-broker-year FE no no no yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.344 0.904 0.916 0.929 0.929 
No. of Obs. 
 
499459 
 
438393 
 
383659 
 
370578 
 
370578 
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Table 3: Falsification Tests 
This table reports results from three falsification tests. In columns (1) and (2), we consider analysts who change 
jobs but still cover the same firm. Specifically, we create a pseudo_connect dummy equal to 1 when the analyst 
issues an earnings forecast within 1 year following a firm insider’s trade through the old broker that the analyst no 
longer works for. In columns (3) and (4), we look at firm insiders who change their brokers but stay at the same 
firm. Specifically, we create a pseudo_connect dummy equal to 1 when the analyst at the no-longer-connected 
brokerage issues an earnings forecast within 1 year following the insider’s trade through the new broker. In 
columns (5) and (6), we consider other insiders at the same firm as the connected insider who trade through a 
different broker. Specifically, we create a pseudo_connect dummy equal to 1 when an analyst issues an earnings 
forecast on the previously connected firm following a trade by an unconnected insider at the old firm (who does 
not trade through this analyst’s brokerage) within 1 year of the original connection breaking. ***, **, and * stand for 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
  Analyst changes job  Insider changes broker Insider changes jobs 
  but covers the same firm  but stays at the same firm but keeps her broker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
connect  -0.0674
**  -0.0673
**  -0.0687
*** 
  
(-2.56) 
 
  
(-2.56) 
 
  
(-2.65) 
 
 
pesudo_connect -0.0168 -0.0201 -0.0066 -0.0026 0.0192 0.0234 
 (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.22) (-0.09) (0.66) (0.81)  
fore_age 
 
0.0509*** 
 
0.0506*** 
 
0.0509*** 
 
0.0506*** 
 
0.0510*** 
 
0.0508*** 
 (6.03) (6.00) (6.02) (6.00) (6.04) (6.01) 
affil -0.1630 -0.1622 -0.1630 -0.1622 -0.1631 -0.1624 
 (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.43) 
 
analyst-broker-firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
analyst-broker-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
firm-year FE 
 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 
No. of Obs. 
 
370580 
 
370580 
 
370578 
 
370578 
 
370578 
 
370578 
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Table 4: Return Predictability: Broker-affiliated Fund Trades in Connected Stocks 
This table reports return predictability results based on change of holdings of broker-affiliated mutual funds 
relative to non-affiliated funds on stocks associated with Form 144 trades. Broker-affiliated mutual funds are 
defined as mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage 
house. Panel A reports the change of holding of broker-affiliated mutual funds relative to non-affiliated funds on 
Form 144-trade stocks following these trades. Panel B reports the returns and alphas to a calendar-time 
long/short strategy. The strategy goes long in the stocks associated with Form 144 trades in which the broker-
affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is larger than the non-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of 
quarterly holding. The strategy goes short in the stocks associated with Form 144 trades in which the broker-
affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is less than the non-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of 
quarterly holding. Abnormal change of holding is defined as the change of holding in the quarter of Form 144 
trades minus the change of holding of the same fund on the same stock in the quarter immediately before where 
none of the firm insiders traded. These portfolios are equally weighted and are held for 3 months after the change 
of quarterly holding is reported. We require each portfolio to contain at least 30 stocks and invest in risk-free 
assets in periods of less than 30 stocks. Reported are the average excess return, the Fama-French three-factor 
alpha, the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha, DGTW-adjusted returns, the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
alpha and the Hou, Xue and Zhang (2016) Q-factor alpha for the full sample. Panel C reports the Fama-MacBeth 
regression results. In column (1), Sell is a dummy equal to 1 when broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of 
quarterly holding is less than the non-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding on the same stock in 
the same quarter and zero otherwise. In column (2), “Abnormal_trade” is the difference of abnormal change of 
quarterly holding between broker-affiliated and non-affiliated funds. Size (LnME) is the natural log of the firm's 
market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-
to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative 
returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short-term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. The sample 
period is from 1997 to 2013.  We exclude stocks with market capitalization in the bottom quintile of NYSE. ***, **, 
and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Trading of broker-affiliated funds and non-affiliated funds following Form 144 trades 
  Affiliated MF Non-affiliated MF Affiliated- 
  
  
Not-affiliated 
Change of Holding -0.03%*** -0.02%*** -0.01%*** 
 
(-13.46) 
 
(-30.93) 
 
(3.62) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Calendar-time portfolio strategy: following the affiliated fund’s trades 
  3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
DGTW 
adjusted FF5 HXZ 
Long -0.20% -0.12% 0.11% -0.07% -0.10% 
 
(-1.13) (-0.71) (0.43) (-0.43) (-0.53) 
Short -0.71%*** -0.70%*** -0.32%*** -0.56%*** -0.59%*** 
 
(-3.54) (-3.45) (-2.59) (-2.62) (-2.63) 
Long-Short 0.51%*** 0.58%*** 0.43%*** 0.48%** 0.49%** 
  
(2.81) 
 
(3.19) 
 
(3.50) 
 
(2.39) 
 
(2.47) 
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Panel C: Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
Sell -0.0038**  
 (-2.27)  
Abnormal_trade  1.2784
* 
  (1.74) 
LnME -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (-0.14) (-0.16) 
LnBM 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.17) (0.25) 
Rev -0.0026 -0.0035 
 (-0.20) (-0.27) 
Mom 0.0046 0.0034 
 (0.78) (0.57) 
Constant 0.0050 0.0041 
 (0.47) (0.37) 
Average R-sq 0.154 0.159 
No. of Obs. 
 
20125 
 
20125 
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Table 5: Falsification Tests: Broker-affiliated Fund Trades 
Broker-affiliated mutual funds are defined as all those mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is part of a 
financial conglomerate involving a brokerage house. Panel A reports return predictability results based on change 
of holdings of broker-affiliated mutual funds relative to non-affiliated funds on non-connected stocks in the same 
quarter as Form 144 trades for connected stocks. The strategy goes long in the non-connected stocks in which 
the broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is larger than the non-affiliated funds’ abnormal 
change of quarterly holding in the same quarter as Form 144 trades. The strategy goes short in the non-connected 
stocks in which the broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is less than the non-affiliated 
funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding in the same quarter as Form 144 trades. Panel B reports return 
predictability results based on change of holdings of broker-affiliated mutual funds relative to non-affiliated funds 
on connected stocks in quarters without Form 144 trades. The strategy goes long in the connected stocks in 
which the broker-affiliated funds’ change of quarterly holding is larger than the non-affiliated funds’ change of 
quarterly holding in quarters without Form 144 trades. The strategy goes short in the connected stocks in which 
the broker-affiliated funds’ change of quarterly holding is less than the non-affiliated funds’ change of quarterly 
holding in quarters without Form 144 trades. Abnormal change of holding is defined as the change of holding in 
the quarter of Form 144 trades minus the change of holding of the same fund on the same stock in the quarter 
immediately before where none of the firm insiders traded. These portfolios are equally weighted and are held for 
3 months following the change of quarterly holding. We require each portfolio to contain at least 30 stocks, and 
invest in risk-free assets in periods of less than 30 stocks. Reported are the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
alpha, the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha and the DGTW-adjusted returns for the full sample. The sample 
period is from 1997 to 2013. We exclude stocks with market capitalization in the bottom quintile of NYSE. ***, **, 
and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Return predictability: Affiliated fund trades in not-connected stocks at the same time 
  3 factor alpha 4 factor alpha DGTW adjusted 
Long 0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 
 
(0.47) (-0.02) (-0.53) 
Short 0.08%** 0.08%** 0.01% 
 
(2.29) (2.10) (0.57) 
Long-Short -0.06% -0.08% -0.03% 
 
(-0.91) (-1.17) (-0.65) 
 
 
Panel B: Return predictability: Affiliated fund trades in connected stocks in periods without any inside-
broker connection  
  3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha DGTW adjusted 
Long 0.10% 0.08% 0.07% 
 
(0.60) (0.51) (0.56) 
Short 0.14% 0.13% 0.03% 
 
(0.86) (0.80) (0.22) 
Long-Short -0.04% -0.05% 0.04% 
  
(-0.26) 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(0.25) 
 
52 
 
Table 6: Falsification Tests: Breaks in the Broker-affiliated Fund’s Advantage 
This table reports return predictability results based on change of holdings of broker-affiliated mutual funds 
relative to non-affiliated funds on pseudo-connected stocks. Broker-affiliated mutual funds are defined as all 
those mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage 
house. Panel A reports the returns and alphas to a calendar-time long/short strategy based on the abnormal 
trading of broker-affiliated funds relative to non-affiliated funds on the insider’s firm following the insider’s 
trading through the new broker. Panel B reports the returns and alphas to a calendar-time long/short strategy 
based on the abnormal trading of broker-affiliated funds relative to non-affiliated funds on the previously 
connected firm following a trade by an unconnected insider at the same firm (who does not trade through this 
fund’s brokerage). Abnormal change of holding is defined as the change of holding in the quarter of Form 144 
trades minus the change of holding of the same fund on the same stock in the quarter immediately before where 
none of the firm insiders traded. These portfolios are equally weighted and are held for 3 months following the 
change of quarterly holding. We require each portfolio to contain at least 30 stocks and invest in risk-free assets in 
periods of less than 30 stocks. Reported are the Fama-French (1993) three-factor alpha, the Carhart (1997) four-
factor alpha and the DGTW-adjusted returns for the full sample. The sample period is from 1997 to 2013. We 
exclude stocks whose market capitalization is in the bottom quintile of NYSE market capitalization.   
 
Panel A: Insider changes her broker but stays at the same firm 
 
  3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha DGTW adjusted 
Long -0.34% -0.25% -0.26% 
 
(-1.15) (-0.85) (-0.97) 
Short -0.23% -0.08% -0.33% 
 
(-0.74) (-0.27) (-1.08) 
Long-Short -0.11% -0.17% 0.07% 
  
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(0.18) 
 
     
     Panel B: Insider changes her job but keeps the same broker 
 
  3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha DGTW adjusted 
Long -0.58%** -0.55%** -0.18% 
 
(-2.25) (-2.10) (-0.81) 
Short -0.50%* -0.42% -0.39%* 
 
(-1.66) (-1.39) (-1.83) 
Long-Short -0.08% -0.13% 0.21% 
  
(-0.31) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(0.94) 
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Table 7: Market Reaction to Recommendation Changes by the Inside Analyst 
This table reports the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around connected and pseudo-connected analysts’ 
recommendation change. We define an analyst’s recommendation as connected if the recommendation is issued 
by an analyst who is employed by a brokerage through which firm insiders trade and the announcement date is 
within 1 year following the insider trade date. Pseudo-connection is defined as recommendations issued by an 
analyst who was connected with the firm at some point in time but is not connected in the current period. The 
control sample is the never-connected analysts who cover the same firm as the connected (or pseudo-connected) 
analysts in the same quarter. In the right-most column, we report the difference in CAR (-1, +1) between the 
connected and pseudo-connected analysts’ recommendation change with respect to their control sample.  
Abnormal return is measured as raw return less the return on either the market (market-adjusted) or Size-Book-
to-market-Momentum matched (DGTW-adjusted) portfolio. In Panel A, we report the results for upgrade 
recommendation changes, and in Panel B, we report the results for downgrade recommendation changes. 
Recommendation initiations are excluded from this sample. The sample period is from 1997 to 2013.        
 
Panel A: Upgrades 
 
Connect Control 
 
Connect minus 
control 
Pseudo- 
connect Control 
Pseudo- connect 
minus control 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Market-adjusted 3.19%*** 2.33%*** 0.86%*** 2.89%*** 2.40%*** 0.49%** 0.37% 
CAR(-1,+1) (13.51) (10.57) (3.23) (13.92) (14.00) (2.03) (1.03) 
        DGTW-adjusted 2.95%*** 2.23%*** 0.72%*** 2.67%*** 2.02%*** 0.65%*** 0.06% 
CAR(-1,+1) 
 
(13.16) 
 
(10.56) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(13.99) 
 
(12.94) 
 
(2.93) 
 
(0.19) 
 
   
 
 
 
      
          Panel B: Downgrades 
 
Connect Control 
 
Connect minus 
control 
Pseudo- 
connect Control 
Pseudo- connect 
minus control 
Diff-
in-Diff 
Market-adjusted -4.10%*** -2.89%*** -1.21%*** -2.66%*** -2.05%*** -0.61%** -0.60% 
CAR(-1,+1) (-13.64) (-11.81) (-4.03) (-12.12) (-12.03) (-2.42) (-1.52) 
        DGTW-adjusted -3.80%*** -2.70%*** -1.10%*** -2.50%*** -1.82%*** -0.68%*** -0.41% 
CAR(-1,+1) 
 
(-13.32) 
 
(-11.74) 
 
(-3.82) 
 
(-11.85) 
 
(-11.26) 
 
(-2.8) 
 
(-1.10) 
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 Table 8: Predictability of Earnings Announcement Returns  
This table reports the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of the first quarterly earnings announcement following 
connected and pseudo-connected analysts’ recommendation change. We define an analyst’s recommendation as 
connected if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who is employed by a brokerage through which firm 
insiders trade and the announcement date is within 1 year following the insider trade date. Pseudo-connection is 
defined as recommendations issued by analysts who were connected with the firm at some point in time but are 
not connected in the current period. In the right-most column, we report the difference in CAR (-1,+1) between 
the connected and pseudo-connected analysts’ recommendations. Abnormal return is measured as raw return less 
the return on either the market (market-adjusted) or Size-Book-to-market-Momentum matched (DGTW-
adjusted) portfolio. In Panel A, we report the results for recommendations that are above the prevailing 
consensus recommendation, and in Panel B, we report the results for recommendations that are below the 
prevailing consensus. Recommendation initiations are excluded from this sample. The sample period is from 1997 
to 2013.  
 
Panel A: Recommendation > consensus 
    
  
 
Connect Pseudo-connect Connect-pseudo 
Market-adjusted 0.83%*** 0.87%*** -0.04% 
CAR(-1,+1) (4.03) (4.29) (-0.13) 
    DGTW-adjusted  0.65%*** 0.74%*** -0.09% 
CAR(-1,+1) 
 
(3.31) 
 
(3.90) 
 
(-0.34) 
 
    
  
 
 Panel B: Recommendation < consensus 
    
 
 
 
 
Connect Pseudo-connect Connect-pseudo 
Market-adjusted 0.16% 0.72%*** -0.56%** 
CAR(-1,+1) (0.82) (3.87) (-2.10) 
    DGTW-adjusted  0.03% 0.56%*** -0.52%** 
CAR(-1,+1) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(3.18) 
 
(-2.07) 
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Table 9: Cross-sectional Tests: Broker-affiliated Analysts  
Panel A of this table reports results of the panel regression of percentage analyst absolute forecast error (PAFE) 
on the connect dummy in different time periods. Connect_preFD (connect_postFD) is the interaction of the 
connect dummy with a dummy indicating the pre (post) Regulation Fair Disclosure period.  
Panel B reports results of the panel regression of percentage analyst absolute forecast error (PAFE) on the 
connect dummy interacted with various firm and insider trade characteristics, an affiliation dummy and forecast 
age, controlling for analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year and firm-year fixed effects. In the first 2 rows, 
connect_smallfirm (connect_bigfirm) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating below 
(above) median market capitalization. In rows 3 and 4, connect_highvol (connect_lowvol) is the interaction of the 
connect dummy with a dummy indicating above (below) median monthly stock return volatility. In rows 5 and 6, 
connect_highdisp (connect_lowdisp) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating above 
(below) median analyst forecast dispersion. In rows 7 and 8, connect_highturn (connect_lowturn) is the 
interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating above (below) median monthly turnover. In rows 9 
and 10, connect_highcov (connect_lowcov) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating 
above (below) median analyst coverage. In rows 11 and 12, connect_growth (connect_value) is the interaction of 
the connect dummy with a dummy indicating above (below) median B/M ratio. In rows 13 and 14, 
connect_highrd (connect_lowrd) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating above (below) 
median R&D intensity. In rows 15 and 16, connect_infretrade (connect_fretrade) is the interaction of the connect 
dummy with a dummy indicating the total number of insider trades that occurred during the period when the 
connect is less (more) than 5. In the last 2 rows, connect_smalltrade (connect_bigtrade) is the interaction of the 
connect dummy with a dummy indicating below (above) median average trade size.  
Panel C reports results of the panel regression of percentage analyst absolute forecast error (PAFE) on the 
connect dummy interacted with various analyst characteristics, an affiliation dummy and forecast age, controlling 
for analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year and firm-year fixed effects. In rows 1 and 2, connect_early2 
(connect_late2) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating that the analyst is within 
(beyond) the first two years of joining the brokerage firm. In rows 3 and 4, connect_early3 (connect_late3) is the 
interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating that the analyst is within (beyond) the first three years 
of joining the brokerage firm. In rows 5 and 6, connect_one-of-many (connect_one-of-few) is the interaction of 
the connect dummy with a dummy indicating that the number of stocks covered by the analyst this year is above 
(below) median. In rows 7 and 8, connect_highskill (connect_lowskill) is the interaction of the connect dummy 
with a dummy indicating that the analysts’ average ranking of forecast accuracy is above (below) median. In rows 
9 and 10, connect_sameloc (connect_nsameloc) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating 
that the analyst and insider are located in the same MSA. In rows 11 and 12, connect_highrcov 
(connect_lowrcov) is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating above (below) median 
residual analyst coverage. 
All variables are defined as in Table 1. The sample includes 600,686 earnings forecasts from 1997 to 2013. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate. ***, **, and * stand for 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Before and after Regulation Fair Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) 
 
connect_preFD 0.0056 
 
(0.23) 
connect_postFD -0.0968*** 
 
(-2.95) 
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Panel B: Which inside analysts are more accurate? 
 
  (1) 
connect_early2 -0.0422 
 
(-0.99) 
connect_later2 -0.0824*** 
 
(-2.83) 
connect_early3 -0.0404 
 
(-1.17) 
connect_later3 -0.0901*** 
 
(-2.79) 
connect_one-of-many -0.0543* 
 
(-1.66) 
connect_one-of-few -0.1051*** 
 
(-2.99) 
connect_highskill -0.0417 
 
(-1.42) 
connect_lowskill -0.0982*** 
 
(-2.81) 
connect_sameloc -0.1851*** 
 
(-2.69) 
connect_nsameloc -0.0529** 
 (-2.04) 
connect_highrcov -0.1320** 
 
(-2.05) 
connect_lowrcov -0.0585** 
 (-2.25) 
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Panel C: Insider trade and insider’s firm characteristics and connected forecast accuracy  
  (1) 
connect_smallfirm -0.1708*** 
 
(-3.49) 
connect_bigfirm -0.0014 
 
(-0.06) 
connect_highvol -0.1529*** 
 
(-3.03) 
connect_lowvol -0.0225 
 
(-1.01) 
connect_highdisp -0.1121*** 
 
(-3.06) 
connect_lowdisp -0.0286 
 
(-0.91) 
connect_highturn -0.1269*** 
 
(-2.86) 
connect_lowturn -0.0085 
 
(-0.42) 
connect_highcov -0.0413 
 
(-1.18) 
connect_lowcov -0.1167*** 
 
(-3.28) 
connect_growth -0.0955** 
 
(-2.32) 
connect_value -0.0404 
 
(-1.38) 
connect_highrd -0.1718*** 
 
(-2.60) 
connect_lowrd 0.0664*** 
                (-2.35)
 
 connect_infretrade         -0.0795*** 
  
 
          (-2.80) 
  connect_fretrade         -0.0508 
  
 
          (-1.05) 
 
 connect_smalltrade         -0.0454  
             (-1.63)  
 connect_bigtrade         -0.1166***  
 
 
          (-2.98) 
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Table 10: Cross-sectional Tests: Broker-affiliated Mutual Funds 
This table reports Carhart (1997) alphas to a long/short portfolio based on change of holdings of broker-
affiliated mutual funds relative to non-affiliated funds, in stocks with Form 144 trades for different subsamples. 
Subsamples are based on firm size, Book-to-market ratio, R&D expenses ratio, idiosyncratic volatility, analyst 
forecast dispersion, stock turnover, residual analyst coverage, number of insider trades, average trade size, number 
of competing funds in a family, manager tenure and fund past 12-month performance. All variables are defined as 
in Table 1. Broker-affiliated mutual funds are defined as all those mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is 
part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage house. The strategy goes long in the stocks with Form 144 
trades in which the broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is larger than the non-affiliated 
funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding on the same stock in the same quarter. The strategy goes short in the 
stocks with Form 144 trades in which the broker-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding is less 
than the non-affiliated funds’ abnormal change of quarterly holding on the same stock in the same quarter. 
Abnormal change of holding is defined as the change of holding in the quarter of Form 144 trades minus the 
change of holding of the same fund on the same stock in the quarter immediately before where none of the firm 
insiders traded. These portfolios are equally weighted and are held for 3 months following the change of quarterly 
holding. We require each portfolio to contain at least 15 stocks and invest in risk-free assets in periods of less 
than 15 stocks. We exclude stocks whose market capitalization is in the bottom quintile of NYSE market 
capitalization. The sample period is from 1997 to 2013.  ***, **, and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively.  
Subsamples Carhart 4-factor alpha t-stat 
 
Small 0.85%*** 2.72 
Big 0.02% 0.08 
Growth 0.71%*** 2.76 
Value 0.42%* 1.67 
High R&D 0.70%*** 2.09 
Low R&D 0.22% 1.12 
High IVOL 0.83%*** 2.88 
Low IVOL 0.36% 1.09 
High disp 0.78%*** 2.78 
Low disp 0.30% 1.27 
High turnover 0.66%** 2.16 
Low turnover 0.19% 0.98 
High residual coverage 0.56%* 1.68 
Low residual coverage 0.56%** 2.31 
Infrequent trades 0.69%*** 2.98 
Frequent trades 0.18% 0.64 
Big trades 0.63%** 2.44 
Small trades 0.36% 1.24 
Large number of competing funds within broker 
firm 0.67%** 2.56 
Small number of competing funds within broker 
firm 0.17% 0.52 
Managers with longer tenure 0.76%*** 3.39 
Managers with shorter tenure 0.34%** 2.09 
Funds with good past 12-month performance 0.51%* 1.84 
Funds with bad past 12-month performance 
 
0.61%*** 
 
2.83 
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Table 11: Affiliated Fund Trading around Routine/Opportunistic Insider Trades 
Panel A reports the quarterly change of broker-affiliated mutual funds’ holding relative to non-affiliated funds in 
stocks associated with routine or non-routine Form 144 trades. Broker-affiliated mutual funds are defined as all 
those mutual funds belonging to a fund family that is part of a financial conglomerate involving a brokerage 
house. Control funds are those not affiliated with any brokerage houses. Following Cohen et al. (2012), routine 
trades are those that occurred in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. 1st_in_sequence trade 
indicates a first-year routine trade. 2nd_in_sequence trade indicates a second-year routine trade. Later_in_sequence 
indicates a routine trade in the third year or beyond. Non-routine trades indicate opportunistic trades. In Panel B, 
we construct calendar-time portfolio on stocks with routine/opportunistic insider trades separately. Reported is 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the equal-weighted portfolio. The sample period is from 1997 to 2013. ***, 
**, and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Affiliated vs. other mutual fund trading around routine/opportunistic insider trades 
 
 Affiliated Control Affiliated - Control 
1st_in_sequence trades 
Change in Fund Holding -0.021%*** -0.046%*** 0.025%** 
 
(-4.71) (-9.95) (2.56) 
    2nd_in_sequence trades 
Change in Fund Holding -0.015%*** -0.022%*** 0.007% 
 
(-2.52) (-11.52) (0.76) 
    Later_in_sequence trades 
Change in Fund Holding -0.020%*** -0.021%*** 0.001% 
 
(-4.06) (-11.06) (0.23) 
    Non-routine trades 
Change in Fund Holding -0.035%*** -0.026%*** -0.009%*** 
 
(-12.34) 
 
(-28.39) 
 
(-3.11) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Calendar-time portfolio alphas based on routine/opportunistic trades 
 
 
 
Carhart 4-factor alphas on Form 144 stocks – others 
 
1st_in_sequence trades 0.48% 
 (1.32) 
2nd_in_sequence trades           0.18% 
          (0.62) 
Later_in_sequence trades 0.05% 
 (0.17) 
Non-routine trades -0.53%*** 
 (-4.66)   
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Table 12: Inside Analyst Forecast Direction and Accuracy following 
Routine/Opportunistic Trades 
This table reports results of the panel regression of signed percentage analyst forecast error (PFE) and absolute 
forecast error (PAFE) on the connect dummy interacted with four dummies indicating routine or opportunistic 
insider trades. Forecast error is defined as forecast EPS minus actual EPS. Following Cohen et al. (2012), routine 
trades are those that occurred in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. Connect_1st_in_seq is the 
interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating a first-year routine trade. Connect_2nd_in_seq is the 
interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating a second-year routine trade. Connect_later_in_seq is 
the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating a routine trade in the third year or beyond. 
Connect_nonroutine is the interaction of the connect dummy with a dummy indicating opportunistic trades.  All 
other variables are defined as in Table 1. The sample includes 600,686 earnings forecasts from 1997 to 2013. We 
control for forecast age, an affiliation dummy, and analyst-broker-firm, analyst-broker-year and firm-year fixed 
effects in the regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate. 
***, **, and * stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Direction Accuracy 
 
connect_1st_in_seq 
 
0.1358** 
 
-0.1044* 
 (2.09) (-1.67)  
connect_2nd_in_seq 
 
-0.0331 
 
-0.0585 
 (-1.60) (-0.86) 
connect_later_in seq  -0.0090 
 
0.0201 
 
(-0.33) 
 
(0.37) 
 
connect_nonroutine -0.0053 -0.0692*** 
 (-0.26) (-2.59) 
fore_age -0.0658*** 0.0507*** 
 (-7.50) (6.00) 
affil 0.1024 -0.1622 
 (1.07) (-1.43) 
firm-year FE yes yes 
analyst-broker-firm FE yes yes 
analyst-broker-year FE yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.847 0.929 
No. of Obs. 
 
370578 
 
370578 
 
 
 
